#05TORONTO2778 #cablegate AMBASSADOR BRIDGE OWNERS UNVEIL BIG PLANS FOR DETROIT 05TORONTO2778

Viewing cable 05TORONTO2778, AMBASSADOR BRIDGE OWNERS UNVEIL BIG PLANS FOR DETROIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05TORONTO2778 2005-10-21 10:13 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Toronto
This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TORONTO 002778

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: ELTN PBTS PREL CA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BRIDGE OWNERS UNVEIL BIG PLANS FOR
DETROIT

REF: TORONTO 2248

Classified By: Acting Consul General Michael Schimmel for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 20 the Detroit Free Press reported that the Ambassador Bridge owners have proposed giving the City of Detroit $30 million to &extend the lease8 on the Detroit Windsor Tunnel and buy some land at the foot of the bridge. Ambassador Bridge owners say they plan to construct a 200-acre super inspection plaza for U.S. and Canadian border enforcement officials. This article was published one day after the latest meeting of the Detroit River International Crossing (DRIC) Study, evaluating possible sites for a new border crossing. Although the Ambassador Bridge owners are publicly stating that there is no need to construct a new crossing between Detroit and Windsor, they appear to be quietly moving behind the scenes toward construction of a second privately-held bridge span. END SUMMARY.

Ambassador Bridge Owners Unveil &Big Plans8 for Detroit
——————————————— ———-

2. (U) The Detroit Free Press reported on October 20, 2005, that the Detroit International Bridge Company (DIBC), operator of the Ambassador Bridge, proposes giving the City of Detroit $30 million to &extend the lease8 on the Detroit Windsor Tunnel and buy about 25 acres of land near the bridge. Officials in the Detroit Mayor,s office touted the benefit to the city budget, and Ambassador Bridge owners emphasized the economic development benefits, estimating that up to 3,000 jobs would be created by the project. Some Detroit City Councilors, however, expressed reservations about the proposal.

3. (U) The proposal involves creation of a 200 acre super inspection plaza for both U.S. and Canadian border enforcement officials in Detroit at the foot of the existing bridge (at an estimated cost of $150 to $200 million). Under this proposal, which would require the concurrence of the Canadian government to station Canadian officials on U.S. soil, all existing border inspection facilities on both sides of the border at the bridge and tunnel would be closed, all inspections would be consolidated on the new site, and a secured two-lane road would be built from the new super inspection plaza to the entrance to the Detroit Windsor Tunnel. Ambassador Bridge officials claimed the resulting efficiencies would dramatically reduce crossing times, enabling the existing crossings to handle more traffic and pushing the need for another bridge span or tunnel expansion 20 to 25 years into the future.

3. (C) Neal Belitsky, Vice President of Operations for the Detroit and Canada Tunnel Corporation (DCTC), told PolOff the DCTC lease with the City of Detroit to operate the tunnel runs through 2020. He noted that the DCTC joint operating agreement with Windsor runs through 2007. Belitsky said he was not certain whether Detroit could legally sell its operating lease with the DCTC.

Is A New Detroit River Crossing In The Cards?
———————————————

4. (C) The Detroit Free Press article was published one day after the latest meeting of the Detroit River International Crossing (DRIC) Study, evaluating possible sites for a new border crossing (NOTE: PolOff attended the meeting and will send a report on its conclusions via septel. END NOTE). U.S. participants in the closed-door meeting noted that constructing a second span parallel to the existing Ambassador Bridge, would probably be acceptable from a U.S. standpoint, if the new crossing were publicly owned. But David Wake, from the Ontario Ministry of Transportation, said he expects the Canadian side will shortly rule out this possibility for social and environmental reasons because it would result in an increased volume of truck traffic running on already congested local roads through downtown Windsor. DRIC meeting participants agreed that, if the bridge span twinning proposal is rejected by Canada, the U.S. side will drop it from consideration.

5. (C) An Army Corps of Engineers representative at the DRIC meeting, said the Ambassador Bridge owners have in recent weeks come to the Corps offices in Detroit to discuss how to obtain the permit required to construct a second bridge span. She, and the Coast Guard representative at the meeting, noted that the U.S. permitting process is basically technical, rather than policy-oriented, and must be completed within 90 days (for the Coast Guard) and 120 days (for the Corps of Engineers). Wake said the bridge owners have been in similar discussions with Canadian government officials. He observed that the Canadian permitting process is similarly technical, noting that it may also be difficult for the Canadian government to avoid issuing a permit if/when they are asked.

6. (C) Comment: Although the Ambassador Bridge owners are publicly stating that there is no need to construct a new crossing between Detroit and Windsor, they appear to be quietly moving behind the scenes toward construction of a second privately-held bridge span. Today,s article in the Detroit Free Press shows the funds the Ambassador Bridge owners are willing to expend to protect their revenue stream (estimated at $1 billion per year by the Detroit Free Press) and gain political support for their plans on the Detroit side of the river. Opening a new span on the Ambassador Bridge site could bring some benefits to the Detroit side of the river where a highway construction project will soon provide the needed road infrastructure to smoothly funnel additional cross-border traffic onto I-75. But adding a bridge span in downtown Windsor would present a difficult challenge for officials on the Canadian side of the river. End Comment.

LECROY

 

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#05OTTAWA3103, #cablegate SPP: FIRST FINANCIAL SERVICES WORKING GROUP 05OTTAWA3103

Viewing cable 05OTTAWA3103, SPP: FIRST FINANCIAL SERVICES WORKING GROUP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05OTTAWA3103 2005-10-17 20:18 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ottawa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 003103

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EB/IFD, EB/OMA, WHA/EPSC, AND WHA/CAN
TREASURY FOR WILBUR MONROE
STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BANK FOR ANN MISBACK
STATE PAS SEC FOR SHAUNA STEELE
STATE PASS OCC FOR GERALYNN BATISTA
STATE PASS COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION FOR
WARREN GORLICK
COMMERCE FOR ISRALY ECHEGARAY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN ETRD ECON PREL CA MX
SUBJECT: SPP: FIRST FINANCIAL SERVICES WORKING GROUP
MEETING YIELDS DELIVERABLES

1. Introduction and Summary: Treasury DAS for International Monetary and Financial Policy Mark Sobel led the U.S. delegation to the first Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) Working Group meeting and the 11th NAFTA Financial Services Committee meeting near Ottawa on October 4, 2005. The session was chaired by Gerry Salembier, Director for Financial Institutions at Finance Canada and the Mexican delegation was led by Guillermo Zamarripa Escamilla, head of the Bank and Savings Unit at the Ministry of Finance (Hacienda). Canada will draft a record of the meeting for clearance by Mexico and the U.S. in which the report on SPP issues will be covered in a format that can be presented as a separate report to the leaders, highlighting completion of the first items in the work plan. There was agreement that the U.S. will host the 2006 meeting, with details to be confirmed later. End Introduction and Summary.

NAFTA Chapter 14
—————-

2. The meeting opened with a review of NAFTA Chapter 14 issues, with most discussion on nominees for the Financial Services roster. Canada and Mexico have proposed five roster members each; the US has proposed four and confirmed that we hope to be able to reveal the fifth nominee within a few weeks, after Congressional consultation. There was consensus on exploring the possibility of flexibility in the length of nominees’ terms. There were no legislative notifications relating to federal reservations in Section A of the Schedules to Annex VII.

SPP Work Plan
————

3. The morning session was devoted to reviewing progress on the SPP work plan for the Financial Services Working Group. Following is a brief and by no means comprehensive summary of some of the major points raised in the discussions. (Numbers are keyed to the June 2005 SPP Report to Leaders.)

– 1. Further collaboration on training programs for bank, securities and insurance regulators and supervisors: The parties will report to Leaders that two items in the work plan have been completed. These items comprise an inventory of existing technical assistance training programs for financial regulators, their value, and whether there is need for more extensive training programs. It was agreed that the existing program is comprehensive and should be continued. The parties also outlined initiatives to boost financial literacy and financial education, agreeing that things are on a positive track and can continue independently of the SPP process.

– 2. Automatic Clearinghouse Issues: The U.S. and Mexico reported progress, but agreed more work will be needed before making the ACH process bi-directional.

– 3. Tax issues: Negotiations are underway between the U.S. and Canada and the working group will evaluate progress at the end of the year. The Canadian side flagged concerns about a non-agenda item – the 30% withholding tax on clients of branches of U.S. insurance companies in Canada.

– 4. Banking/Tax issues: On tax issues, the FSWG recognized that U.S. and Canadian negotiators are working on revision of the bilateral tax treaty, and it was agreed to update those elements of the work plan towards the end of this year. The FSWG will report that an item regarding information sharing on interest income by Canadian nationals will be dropped from the work plan as it has progressed as much as possible.

– 5. Banking and insurance issues: the Mexican delegation noted that the sectors are very distinct in Mexico. The fact that 80% of bank capital is foreign changes the dynamic. On insurance issues, experts will be meeting later this month and their findings will be incorporated into the FSWG’s final meeting report.

– 6. Securities issues: Salembier reminded WG participants that in Canada regulatory jurisdiction is provincial and stressed the Federal government’s commitment to remedying that “piece of unfinished business.” The Finance minister met last week with provincial counterparts to discuss evolution towards a single national securities regulator. Salembier noted that Quebec has temporarily exempted the London Stock Exchange from recognition requirements as a step towards facilitating exchange access. The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) continues its strong advocacy for access to U.S. trading screens. The SEC invited the TSX to meet with the new chairman to explain their proposal. Salembier, in an aside, noted that firms would welcome clarification from the SEC on when contacts in the U.S. trigger the “solicitation” recognition threshold.

– 7 With regard to reciprocity/harmonization of insurance requirements for motor carriers, the GOC side hoped that “in the spirit of progress” they would see a more forthright response from the U.S. to get the process underway. The U.S. side responded that the Insurance Trilateral Working Group would follow up on this and other issues in the near future, and their results could be incorporated into the report.

– 8. Annuities: The issues under this category remain bracketed. The Mexican delegation stressed that reform of Mexico’s social security system is a thorny domestic issue that will be handled in channels other than the SPP.

– 9. Supervisory and Regulatory Standards: There was some discussion of the nature of this item on the work plan, but agreement that the parties will continue to cooperate in facilitating application of standards and, where appropriate, working towards convergence.

– 10. Financing for Development: The Canadian chair of the FSWG explained that despite efforts to interpret the scope of the working group as broadly and comprehensively as possible, establishing a grant to fund development in Mexico fell outside his area of jurisdiction and might be more usefully pursued by another SPP working group. The U.S. expressed similar views. It was agreed that although this item is bracketed and is unlikely to progress under the auspices of the FSWG, it will remain on the work plan unless or until the Mexican Presidency decides it should be removed.

NAFTA Financial Services Committee
———————————-

4. The meeting continued in the afternoon with updates by each party on regulatory and legislative developments and the financial services aspects of other international agreements. Mexico provided a preview on plans for changes in bank regulation, covering complementary services companies, capitalization standards, multiple scope financial institutions and bank investments. Other plans include a project on sanctions implementation on financial institutions, a new securities market law and reform of the insurance laws.

5. Canada reviewed upcoming legislative initiatives including the 5-year review of financial sector legislation, enhancements to the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regime and changes in private defined benefit pension plans.

Update on Fireman’s Fund
————————

6. Mexico provided an update on the status of this NAFTA Chapter 11 case, and Canada, stressing its neutrality in matters of fact, provided copies of its submission on the prudential carve-out.

Visit Canada’s Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa

WILKINS

 

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#07OTTAWA1192 #cablegate CANADIAN MPS RAISE BORDER AND SPP CONCERNS

Viewing cable 07OTTAWA1192, CANADIAN MPS RAISE BORDER AND SPP CONCERNS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07OTTAWA1192 2007-06-20 20:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO0720
RR RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #2048/01 3112037
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 072037Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6866
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1768
RHFJUSC/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAIAO/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
 
VZCZCXRO1040
RR RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #1192/01 1712003
ZNY EEEEE ZZH
R 202003Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5950
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1684
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY IA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY IAIP WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001192

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DHS FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THERESA BROWN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2017
TAGS: KHLS PGOV PREL CA
SUBJECT: CANADIAN MPS RAISE BORDER AND SPP CONCERNS

1. (SBU/NF) Summary: In a recent Border Caucus meeting with the Ambassador and in one-on-one meetings with Emboffs, MPs have expressed a wide variety of issues about the border and cross border travel and trade. Most of the MPs from border provinces say they have as one of their key issues (not just key bilateral issues, but key issue period), the implementation of WHTI. They continue to press for any relief they can get on the passport requirement, arguing that it will hurt trade, tourism, and long-standing relationships between border towns. There is also concern by MPs who live in the Windsor area about bridge expansion and management and a desire for clarity and strategic planning between the U.S. and Canada on this key issue. Finally, it is interesting to note concern among some MPs, notably in the NDP, over the course of SPP. They focus on perceived negatives in NAFTA in the areas of labor and the environment and extrapolate that things can only get worse with the SPP. Embassy is well tooled to push back against these arguments and continues to meet with all comers to explain our positions. End Summary
2. (SBU/NF) Ambassador met with some 12 members of the Border Caucus recently for a luncheon and Emboffs have met recently with eight or so other MPs to discuss bilateral and border issues. The following is a compilation of the issues they raised and their views:

– France Bonsant, BQ – Stanstead, Quebec, Closure of Streets in Stanstead: Ms. Bonsant raised an issue which hit the press June 20 — the closure to through traffic of three streets in a village in her riding that abuts a Vermont village on the other side of the border, thus dividing what is effectively one town (Stanstead, QB and Derby Line, VT). This is apparently one of those towns where building and streets are literally split by the border and pedestrians who cross into the U.S. while traversing the street are instructed through signboards to report themselves to US Customs. The local community has received reports that the streets will soon be closed by US authorities in order to channel people through the nearest port of entry. TV reports indicate that this would have to be voluntary as the open streets are protected by treaty. Bosant wrote the Ambassador asking for his help in keeping the streets open and maintaining the flow of the towns as they are.

– Bonsant, Scanner for Christmas Trees: It was clear from these exchanges that Canadian MPs are interested in down-to-earth issues of commerce and travel that affect their constituents. Bonsant also expressed concern about the lack of a scanner for one of the crossings in her riding where hundreds of thousands of Christmas trees are shipped to the U.S. each year but are delayed at the border for inspection. She asked us to look into the issue of increasing efficiency at key border posts, in this case, by the addition of better technology.

– Judy Sgro, Liberal – York West, Ontario, Management of Ambassador Bridge: In a meeting with Poloff, Ms. Sgro asked for reassurance about how the Ambassador Bridge was being managed in terms of security and expansion. She was uncomfortable with the private sector management of the bridge in an era of rising threats and sought assurances that there was strategic planning being conducted by our two governments on the future of the bridge. Qgovernments on the future of the bridge.

– Jeff Watson, Conservative – Essex, Ontario, Ambassador Bridge Expansion: Like Sgro, Watson covers a riding whose current economy depends on the smooth operation of the Ambassador Bridge, and whose future economy depends on the expansion of the bridge. He is very interested in the ongoing negotiations over twinning and the third span and the various options for this, and wants to see a better bilateral planning process for the future of the cross border infrastructure. He is concerned by recent indications that the U.S. may not be fully supportive of the Detroit River International Crossing (DRIC) planning process. “If the DRIC is undermined,” Watson said, “there will be a free for all and the required infrastructure upgrades will be delayed,” with potentially negative consequences for the cross border economy. NDP MP Brian Masse from Windsor similarly is concerned with rumors he has heard that officials on the Michigan side of the border are considering abandoning the bi-national planning process.

– Watson, Pre-Clearance Negotiations: Watson would also like to see negotiations on pre-clearance continue. He basically expressed interest in anything that would help the border to function more efficiently and for vehicles and

OTTAWA 00001192 002 OF 002

cargo to move more smoothly.

– Gord Brown, Conservative, Leeds-Greenville, Ontario, Future Travel under WHTI: Brown said he owns hotels in the Greenville area and watches bookings closely. He said to date things are not bad and he has not seen an impact from WHTI jitters on cross border travel. He is concerned, however, with the impact of the WHTI requirements on group travel, and hopes that if we cannot change the passport requirement we will at the very least clarify the requirement so that groups and individuals can plan with certainty.

– Peter Stoffer, NDP, Sackville, Eastern Shore, NS, SPP Impact on Labor and Environment: Stoffer is one of the more conservative of the NDP members, but nonetheless expressed concern to Poloff about the direction the SPP is headed. The NDP, he said, is primarily concerned about the impact on labor and the environment and has some detailed issues it would like to ensure are considered throughout the SPP process. He complained about lack of inclusiveness on the Canadian side during the discussions — the NDP critic, Peter Julian was not invited to the Calgary talks, for example, nor were representatives of the Canadian Labor Congress. Stoffer said they would like to ensure that no one is left out of the discussions. He also said the NDP position is to keep some things off the table altogether as the process moves forward. Finally he suggested we not use the word “integration” when discussing SPP, since people on his side of the political fence have a major problem with anything that smacks of Canada being pulled into the American orbit.

3. (SBU/NF) Comment: In these and other discussions with MPs we get a good sense for the range of issues they are facing in border ridings. They leave us with several observations. First, there is a need for constant dialogue on key issues. Canadians want to feel like they are part of the planning process and resent when we simply make decisions and inform them. Second, they appreciate clarity. On WHTI and the Ambassador Bridge what hurts us most if simple lack of clarity about what will happen and when. Third, there is considerable disinformation about SPP and beating this back will take a concerted effort. On the Canadian side there may be more work to do to expand the circle of shareholders who are part of the process, ensuring all voices are heard as decisions are made.

Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada & Mexico) at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap

WILKINS

 

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#07OTTAWA2058 #cablegate THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART III OF III…) 07OTTAWA2058

Viewing cable 07OTTAWA2058, THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART III OF III – IMMIGRATION, FIRST NATIONS, WHTI, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT)

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07OTTAWA2058 2007-11-08 18:12 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO0720
RR RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #2048/01 3112037
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 072037Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6866
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1768
RHFJUSC/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAIAO/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 002058

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KCRM PGOV ASEC KHLS ECON CASC CA
SUBJECT: THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART III OF III – IMMIGRATION, FIRST
NATIONS, WHTI, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT)

SUMMARY
——-
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED–PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

1. (SBU) As part of a year-long effort to “map the border,”
Mission Canada officers visited the frontier to observe
ground truth in how the border functions and how to make it
work better. Part I of this three-part series reviewed
conclusions and recommendations, Part II covered ports of
entry, trade, and the environment. This third part reviews
immigration models, First Nations issues, WHTI, and law
enforcement.

IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM
——————————–

2. (SBU) Canada has taken in over one million immigrants
since September 2001, about 200,000 per year, and now its
population has the second highest proportion of immigrants in
the world at 17%, surpassed only by Australia at 21%. The
forecast in 2008 is 265,000 new immigrants. Before 1960
Canada’s immigrants came from Europe, but changing economic
and demographic trends have resulted in an influx of East and
South Asians since the 1980s. India, China, and the
Philippines are the three most important source countries for
new immigrants to Canada. Immigrants in Canada settle
primarily in large cities, with over 46% of Toronto’s
population now being foreign born, followed by Vancouver
(37.5%), Montreal (28%), and Ottawa (17%).

3. (SBU) Canadian officials point out that there are multiple
checkpoints along the road to immigration and a solid system
for reviewing the names and background of immigrants along
the way. In Mission Canada’s judgment, Canada’s system for
immigration security checks approaches that of the U.S.
(Comment: However, although its focus is on all travelers to
Canada and not immigrants in particular, the October 30,
2007, report by the Auditor General on the Canada Border
Services Agency points up the need for better use by CBSA of
risk-based processes (including collection and analysis of
intelligence) and improved procedures for creating and using
lookouts. End comment.)

4. (SBU) In December 2004, Canada and the U.S. implemented a
“Safe Third” agreement as part of the Smart Border Action
Plan. Safe Third guidelines prevent refugee applicants from
applying for refugee status in more than one country or
“asylum shopping,” i.e., not looking primarily for protection
from persecution but rather for the country with high
acceptance rates and the most generous resettlement
arrangements. This agreement was the first of its kind for
Canada, and still represents the only safe third agreement in
force here. Currently it affects only those refugees who
apply for asylum at a land border port of entry, and not
those who fly from U.S. airports into Canada or make asylum
claims at inland offices. Since the implementation of this
agreement, Canada has seen a one-third drop in refugee
applications.

WHTI – GENERAL
————–

5. (SBU) When Congress passed the December 2004 Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, few people focused on
the details of the text, including the provision requiring
Qthe details of the text, including the provision requiring
that all travelers entering or re-entering the United States
would eventually be required to present a passport or other
secure, accepted document when applying for admission.
(Currently, NEXUS, FAST, SENTRY, active duty military and
merchant mariner’s IDs are accepted alternatives.) The
administration has implemented this requirement through the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), requiring air
travelers to have a passport beginning January 23, 2007, to
be followed at a later date by those entering the U.S. by
land or sea (to include ferries).

6. (SBU) The WHTI passport requirement was not well received
in Canada. Many perceived it as an unfriendly gesture toward

OTTAWA 00002058 002 OF 004

a country that is not only America’s largest trading partner,
but which has proven itself a steadfast and loyal ally in
both war and peace. Because of the unique U.S.-Canada
relationship, many of our northern neighbors thought there
should be special circumstances for Canadians. The
Government of Canada, Canadian parliamentarians and
provincial government officials made entreaties across the
board, asking essentially for Canadian citizens to be
exempted from the passport rule. The Border Caucus and many
individual Members of Parliament, as well as Canadian tourist
and travel associations, submitted comments on the notice of
proposed rulemaking requiring passports.

7. (SBU) The consistent message of Mission Canada, from
Ottawa to Halifax to Vancouver, has been that Canadians, like
American citizens, need to get a passport. There are no
exemptions for Canadians any more than there are for
Americans.

FIRST NATIONS SEEK WHTI EXCEPTION
———————————
8. (SBU) We have heard concerns from both Native Americans
and “First Nations” (the Canadian equivalent of our Native
Americans, referring to Indians, but not to Inuit (our
Eskimos) or Metis (persons of mixed Caucasian, mainly French,
and Indian origin) communities about the impact of WHTI. The
concerns are both practical (costs and bureaucracy) and
ideological: Canadian First Nations’ members perceive
themselves to be “people of the land” with a sovereign and
inherent right to traverse the border, without a need to
employ a document attesting to citizenship. First Nations
interlocutors frequently reference the Jay Treaty of 1794
between the UK and USA, which they assert provides the right
of “free passage” back and forth across the frontier.

9. (SBU) In fact, the Jay Treaty was abrogated when
hostilities commenced between the United States and United
Kingdom in 1812. Nevertheless, elements of that Treaty have
been incorporated into U.S. law; e.g., Section 289 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act which provides that “Nothing
in this title shall be construed to affect the right of
American Indians born in Canada to pass the borders of the
United States, but such right shall extend only to persons
who possess at least 50 per centum of blood of the American
Indian race.” (No equivalent exists in Canadian law.)

10. (SBU) Thus, American law allows for “free passage” across
the border, but the law does not exempt individuals from
documentary requirements; compliance with the documentary
requirements of WHTI is necessary. Some First Nations groups
have inquired whether the Canadian government’s “Status
Indian Card” would provide sufficient documentary proof.
Canada has some 770,500 Registered Indians on the Indian
Register maintained by the Ministry of Indian and Northern
Affairs. Individuals on the Indian Register are entitled to
Status Indian Cards (AKA Treaty Cards) verifying their
eligibility for various social services, health care, and
duty-free privileges. Ottawa is nearly ready to produce a
Qduty-free privileges. Ottawa is nearly ready to produce a
more secure new generation of Status Indian Card. Canada
intends to submit the new card to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) for consideration as an “alternative document”
that would meet WHTI requirements. DHS has indicated that it
will take a look at the new Status Indian Card. Several
First Nations groups have expressed interest in producing
their own ID cards for border crossing purposes. From a
border management perspective, a standard, secure, uniform
Status Indian Card is clearly preferable to a plethora of
cards issued by individual First Nations’ authorities.

WHTI – AIR
———-

11. (SBU) The passport requirement went into effect on
January 23 for air travelers. Prior to that time, Mission
Canada engaged in a concerted outreach and public information
campaign to ensure that both Canadians and Americans resident
in Canada were aware of the new regulation. Air travel from
Canada to the U.S. was not disrupted on January 23 because of

OTTAWA 00002058 003 OF 004

the passport requirement. An estimated 97 percent of
travelers were in possession of passports when they arrived
at the check-in desk. By January 26, an estimated 99 percent
of travelers were in compliance.

12. (SBU) One reason that implementation of the WHTI air rule
went so smoothly was Mission Canada’s proactive approach in
getting the message out. Another factor was CBP’s phased-in
transition of the requirement, which provided that CBP would
not fine carriers that boarded U.S.-bound passengers who did
not have passports (but did have other legitimate documents
attesting to identity and citizenship). Officers at all
posts in Mission Canada worked with CBP preclearance officers
at Canadian airports to inform the carriers of this liberal
phased-in approach. Many of the air carrier station managers
in Canada, particularly at smaller interior airports, had not
heard about the phased-in program and were planning to deny
boarding to passengers without passports on January 23. Once
they received the updated and accurate information, airline
personnel did not deny boarding simply for lack of a
passport. The delayed flights, long lines of angry and
disgruntled passengers, and complaints to the media that many
expected did not occur. As the Deputy Chief of Mission
described it, watching January 23 preclearance processing in
Toronto’s Pearson Airport, “It was a non-event event.”

WHTI – LAND
———–

13. (SBU) The challenge ahead is how best to prepare
travelers to meet the second part of the WHTI regulations,
which will require anyone entering the U.S. through the land
border to have a valid passport or approved alternate
document. Barring legislation to change the schedule, this
part will be implemented (again, likely via a phased-in
process) in 2008. (Comment: Secretary Chertoff told the
Ambassador in an October 29, 2007 meeting that DHS intended
to enforce the requirement for passports or other acceptable
secure documents on people entering the U.S. by land and sea
in the late s or early fall of 2008. Although this was not a
fixed date, DHS would definitely impose the passport
requirement during 2008. End comment.) The Canadian
government has been in denial for a long while, holding out
the hope that the U.S. Congress and administration would
amend the law in ways favorable to Canada. Canada’s delay in
working out a way to comply with U.S. air entry rules
resulted in a last-minute rush on Canadian passport offices
early in 2007. Canadian passport applicants waited three
months for a passport, causing thousands to change their
spring and summer travel plans for 2007. We do not see
enough progress on the Canadian side to prevent a similar
passport backlog when land crossings require a passport in
2008. Canadian officials are still hopeful that Congress
will mandate the implementation date for passports for land
border crossings to be June of 2009.

WHTI – ALTERNATE DOCUMENTS
————————–

14. (SBU) Canadian provincial and U.S. state governments are
Q14. (SBU) Canadian provincial and U.S. state governments are
now seeking to produce an acceptable alternative land border
crossing document that can be used an an alternative a
passport. Washington State initiated a pilot project to
produce an enhanced, more secure driver’s license that
records the bearer’s citizenship. DHS says that it is
willing to consider the use of such a document at the land
border. The pilot project is being developed in fall 2007,
with the first enhanced licenses possibly issued early in
2008. British Columbia has proposed a similar driver’s
license project. The states of Vermont, Arizona, and New
York have agreed to issue enhanced driver’s licenses, and
California and Ohio may join that group. The provinces of
Ontario and Quebec have also indicated that they will issue
enhanced driver’s licenses. In the case of Ontario at least,
an enhanced driver’s license may take more time and expense
to properly implement than Ontario authorities would like to
admit. Ontario driver’s licenses are stored and issued by
private, storefront contractors, not provincial government

OTTAWA 00002058 004 OF 004

officers, and the media has pointed out gaps in
accountability and security.

BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT – TOWARDS A SEAMLESS APPROACH
——————————————— ——-

15. (SBU) The post-9/11 move to enhance security on the
border has led to a number of new initiatives to eliminate
gaps in border geography, enhance information sharing, and
better coordinate law enforcement operations. Mission Canada
reinvigorated several fora to better coordinate cross border
crime and counter-terrorism policy – principally the Cross
Border Crime Forum and the Bilateral Consultative Group on
Counter-Terrorism. The U.S. and Canada conducted the first
trial “Shiprider” program to move towards cooperative marine
policing of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway, which we
hope will see law enforcement officers of both nations
assigned to the other’s border patrol boats. Our two
countries initiated the Integrated Border Enforcement Team
(IBET) program, in which officers from the U.S. and Canada
share office space at 15 locations on both sides of the
border in order to better share information and coordinate
local law enforcement activities. And the U.S. and Canada
have conducted national and local exercises to test our
systems for responding to cross-border incidents.

Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada &
Mexico) at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap

Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada & Mexico) at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap

WILKINS

 

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#07OTTAWA2048 #cablegate THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART II OF III…) 07OTTAWA2048

Viewing cable 07OTTAWA2048, THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART II OF III – PORTS OF ENTRY, TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT)

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  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07OTTAWA2048 2007-11-07 20:37 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa

VZCZCXRO0720
RR RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #2048/01 3112037
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 072037Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6866
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1768
RHFJUSC/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAIAO/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC

 

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 002048

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KCRM PGOV ASEC KHLS ECON CA
SUBJECT: THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART II OF III – PORTS OF ENTRY,
TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT)

SUMMARY
—————
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED–PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

1. (SBU) As part of a year-long effort to “map the border,”
Mission Canada officers fanned out along the frontier to
observe ground truth in how the border functions and how to
make it work better. Part I of this three-part series
covered our conclusions and recommendations. This message
covers reports on ports of entry, trade, and the environment.
Message III covers WHTI, law enforcement, and First Nations
issues.

PORTS OF ENTRY – A SERIES OF GATES WITH NO FENCES
——————————————— —-

2. (SBU) In September 2004 meetings in Ottawa with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) counterparts, Canadian
Deputy Minister of Public Safety Margaret Bloodworth
described the U.S.-Canada border as “a series of gates with
no fence between them.” This is an apt description of the
5,500 mile border running through land and waterways all the
way from the Atlantic Ocean to Alaska. Along this border
there are some 120 “gates,” or ports of entry, including
eight at Canadian airports served by CBP preclearance
officers. These ports run the gamut from mammoth facilities
staffed by hundreds of personnel, like the Detroit-Windsor
crossing, to small shed-like structures where a half-dozen
officers (three from each country) share a common inspection
area and even joint kitchen facilities.

3. (SBU) The U.S. and Canada are attempting to make our ports
“smarter” by introducing technology that offers both enhanced
security and quicker processing time. Radiation and X-ray
portals can conduct an inspection without a physical search.
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are being developed
at the ports to link information about incoming and outgoing
traffic in order to expedite the flow of traffic. Simple
electronic fixes, like lighted arrow signs to direct vehicles
to the least congested lanes, or infrastructure innovations
like dual-use inspection booths that can handle either trucks
or cars depending on traffic volumes at a particular time,
have been introduced at many crossings. Larger, more
expensive improvements, like adding lanes to existing
bridges, expanding truck plazas or building new bridges, such
as is contemplated at Detroit-Windsor, are efforts to ensure
that the flow of goods and people is not impeded as volumes
of both grow in the future. It will be important to track
new infrastructure projects to make sure that they are, in
fact, keeping up with increasing demand.

4. (SBU) Canadian politicians as well as ordinary citizens
have expressed concern over the increased security
implemented along the border following 9/11. They frequently
talk of a “thickening” of the border, and Canada’s 37-member
border caucus in Parliament sent a letter to its counterparts
in the U.S. expressing dismay that the increasing scrutiny
given to those wishing to cross the border to visit family or
friends, attend a church service or ball game, or just to buy
a pizza, was “diminishing” the relationship between Canadians
and Americans. Indeed, for years the residents in the many
Qand Americans. Indeed, for years the residents in the many
small communities that straddle the border may not have
needed to show a border inspector anything more than a wave
and a smile to be permitted to cross; now, however, that has
changed.

ECONOMY AND TRADE – MAINTAINING PREDICTABLE MARKET ACCESS
——————————————— ————

5. (SBU) With over US DOLS 1.5 billion worth of goods and
services moving across the border daily, Canada and the
United States are each other’s largest customers and biggest
suppliers. To put this in perspective, in 2006 Canada
exchanged more goods with the U.S. each month than it did
with any other country throughout the entire year.

6. (SBU) Canada’s merchandise trade with the United States
totaled US DOLS 507 billion in 2006. By value, this trade
was conducted by truck (61 percent), rail 17 percent),

OTTAWA 00002048 002 OF 003

pipeline (13 percent), air (5 percent), and sea/inland
waterways (4 percent). Around 75 per cent of Canada-U.S.
trade (in value terms) carried by trucks went through just
six border crossing points: the Ambassador Bridge linking
Detroit and Windsor; the Peace Bridge linking Buffalo and
Fort Erie; the Blue Water Bridge linking Port Huron,
Michigan, and Sarnia; Champlain/Lacolle between New York and
Quebec; Pembina/Emerson between North Dakota and Manitoba;
and Pacific Highway between Washington and British Columbia.
The Detroit-Windsor Corridor is the busiest trade artery,
accounting for almost 30% of total Canada-U.S. trade.

7. (SBU) Given the magnitude of the transborder economic
relationship and the high degree of Canadian dependence on
the American market, the United States’ post-9/11 increased
attention to security at the border is a major source of
on-going anxiety for Canada’s government and business
community. Since 2001 maintaining and enhancing secure,
predictable access to the United States economy has been a
primary objective of Canadian governments. In discussions at
the several working groups that meet to discuss border issues
and what might happen in the event of a crisis, U.S.
officials frequently use the term “business resumption.”
Canadian officials speak of “business continuation” and are
loth to think that the border could ever be fully shut down
again as it was in some places in the days immediately after
9/11. Of course, this anxiety regarding keeping the border
open, even during an emergency, is shared by many members of
the U.S. private sector whose businesses depend on a
predictable and uninterrupted supply of raw materials, parts,
or finished products from Canada.

8. (SBU) As a consequence, any new U.S. policy or action that
impacts the border, however seemingly minor, precipitates a
massive reaction from government and the private sector. The
imposition of the APHIS fees in early 2007 is a case in point
with the government in Ottawa and the Canadian Chamber of
Commerce, among others, describing the modest fee as
potentially the “straw that broke the camel’s back.” A
recent survey of industry by the Conference Board of Canada
found no evidence to suggest that post-9/11 border policies
have served to reduce Canadian export volumes to the U.S.
Nevertheless, industry representatives and Canadian
government officials at the provincial and federal level
continue to raise concerns about potential disruptions in
trade between the two countries, in the form of
security-related delays and increased compliance costs.

9. (SBU) Maximizing the free flow of goods, services, and
capital with the U.S. (and leveraging that relationship in
the global marketplace to enhance Canada’s profile and
opportunities) is a key priority for Canada. In response to
the need to maintain, and indeed enhance the transportation
and border infrastructure that supports U.S. – Canada trade,
the Canadian government has adopted a “National Policy
Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade Corridors” to
guide investment and government action. The Policy Framework
Qguide investment and government action. The Policy Framework
also notes that Canada, due to its proximity and access to
the United States, could serve as the “platform” to connect
North America with the world, for example, via Vancouver Port
which has high container capacity and rail connections to the
mid-west, south-central and eastern United States. The
Policy Framework also pins high hopes on development of the
new container port at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, as a
transshipment point from which Asian goods will be moved all
the way to the Atlantic coast.

TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES – WATER, AIR, WASTE
——————————————— ———

10. (SBU) The U.S. and Canada work closely together to manage
transboundary environmental issues. One major instrument of
this cooperation is the International Joint Commission (IJC),
established as part of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to
resolve differences and promote cooperation on our shared
waters. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972,
another historic example of joint cooperation, is
instrumental in managing the world’s largest repository of
fresh water, and the U.S.-Canada Air Quality Agreement serves

OTTAWA 00002048 003 OF 003

as the primary mechanism for binational cooperation to
address transboundary air pollution issues.

11. (SBU) Notwithstanding the close cooperation and general
goodwill, some friction does exist. Current transboundary
issues of concern include: a new outlet from Devils Lake in
North Dakota which channels water into the Red River system
and onward to Manitoba; Ontario’s concerns about increasingly
poor air quality in southern Ontario, including Toronto,
which some claim is largely due to coal-burning power plants
in the Ohio River Valley; and the movement of up to 400
truckloads a day of trash from the Greater Toronto Area to
Michigan landfills.

12. (SBU) This last issue illustrates the complexities of the
border relationship and the multiple jurisdictions it
involves. Canada and the United States have open borders for
waste shipments – which are considered tradeable goods – and
waste has flowed across the border in both directions for
many years. Figures from the Canadian government as well as
from states and provinces show that the United States is a
net exporter to Canada of hazardous waste. However, because
of plentiful landfill capacity, low-cost disposal options,
and existing contractual arrangements, the United States is a
much larger net importer from Canada of non-hazardous solid
waste.

13. (SBU) The influx of waste has been highly controversial,
in part because of the limited legal authority of state and
local governments to restrict it. Only Congress can
authorize restrictions to interstate and international
movement of trade, including waste. Nevertheless,
Congressional interest in stopping the flow of trash led to a
voluntary agreement between Michigan’s two Senators and the
Ontario Ministry of the Environment, under which Ontario
committed to eliminate shipments of municipally managed waste
to Michigan by the end of 2010. While the agreement does not
formally bind the United States or Canada or the parties
shipping and receiving the waste, or address commercial waste
shipments to Michigan, It may reduce the controversy. Also
working to defuse the issue is the city of Toronto’s recent
acquisition of additional landfill capacity in Ontario.

Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada &
Mexico) at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap

Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada & Mexico) at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap

WILKINS

 

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courage is contagious

 


#07OTTAWA2035 #cablegate THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART I OF III…) 07OTTAWA2035

Viewing cable 07OTTAWA2035, THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART I OF III – SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs.

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol).
Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07OTTAWA2035.

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07OTTAWA2035 2007-11-05 22:18 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO8427
RR RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #2035/01 3092218
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 052218Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6854
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1763
RHFJUSC/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHDC
RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEAIAO/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 002035

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL KCRM PGOV ASEC KHLS ECON CA
SUBJECT: THE U.S. – CANADA BORDER IN 2007: GROUND TRUTH AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS (PART I OF III – SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY
————————-

1. (SBU) Managing U.S.-Canada relations means managing the
border. It’s that simple. And that makes the border the
number one priority for Mission Canada. For the past year
dozens of officers from the Embassy and our seven consulates
have fanned out across Canada to observe the border and
discuss border issues with citizens and officials of both
Canada and the United States. Their conclusions and analysis
are collected here, together with recommendations on how we
can better manage our compelling national interest along this
vital frontier.

2. (SBU) In general, the border works well, but there are
places where increases in traffic and trade amidst aging or
outdated infrastructure are causing unnecessarily long wait
times. We saw significant but piecemeal progress in border
modernization. We learned that the United States and Canada
view the border differently, both in terms of its importance
and the relative prioritization of security and openness, but
both countries highly value the north-south linkages and the
unique cross-border communities that dot the frontier. We
found that each border crossing has its own unique
personality, which requires policy and regulatory flexibility
to manage well. We saw that the current environment is
dominated by WHTI and the new post-9/11 security measures,
particularly unilateral initiatives from the U.S. side.
Finally, the sense we got from the ground was that the
security threat is real but manageable without resorting to
draconian, disruptive procedures.

3. (SBU) A number of concrete recommendations flow from these
conclusions. First, both countries need to more
systematically manage improvements to border infrastructure.
Secondly, we need to focus constantly on port of entry
staffing, which can be a major factor in managing border
flow. Thirdly, the two governments should continue an open
dialogue on how to further the agenda on cooperative policing
and information sharing. Fourth, we must inform the public
in real time about changes, security, and regulations
affecting the border. Finally, we need a more systematic
way to manage bilateral border issues, something akin to the
Bilateral Consultative Group on counter-terrorism, which
convenes all agencies on an annual basis to review issues and
advance the agenda. Maintaining the historically unique
cross-border travel and trade relations, while ensuring
security of both countries is all about managing change, and
we hope that this cable will contribute to our ability to do
so.

4. (SBU) This is a three-part cable series. Part I covers
the summary, conclusions, and recommendations. Part II
reviews ports of entry, the economy, and environmental
issues. Part III involves immigration, First Nations issues,
WHTI, and cross border law enforcement.

AMBASSADOR’S INTRODUCTION
————————-

5. (SBU) On behalf of Mission Canada, I would like to invite
anyone with even a passing interest in our northern border
to peruse the year-long project we have just concluded to get
a clearer snapshot of our border in the year 2007. You can
Qa clearer snapshot of our border in the year 2007. You can
access detailed reports submitted throughout the course of
the year on our classified web site
(http://ottawa.state.sgov.gov), and there is an extensive
power point presentation on our State Department SBU intranet
website under the Political Affairs Section – Reports and
Cables (http://ottawa.state.gov) that provides a unique
visual image of the border in 2007.

6. (SBU) This time last year, first in response to concerns
on the part of Canadians and Americans from all walks of life
and second as a contribution to implementation of the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative, this Mission embarked on a
nationwide, integrated border reporting project. We traveled
to almost every border crossing, talked to officials involved
in border management, and visited communities in both
countries most directly affected by new border measures. We

OTTAWA 00002035 002 OF 005

heard how important it was to “get the border right”; we
heard how the border is “priority one”; and we heard how the
way of life among border communities was changing. We saw
how some new measures such as improved border infrastructure,
additional lanes, plazas, and other equipment have made it
easier to get across the border. However, we also saw long
back-ups and increasing inspections. We found towns with
libraries which straddle the border and others which could
only be reached by traveling through the other country. We
visited border crossings marked by a chain across a dirt road
and others with 14 inspection booths for truck lanes.

7. (SBU) The end result is a historic snapshot of our
northern border in the year 2007. It is a border at a
crossroads, still in transition, moving away from the
pre-9/11 optimism of open borders, with increasing volumes of
just-in-time deliveries and communities connected by junior
hockey and shopping, towards the concept outlined 5 years ago
of a “smart border” that uses technologies to strengthen our
border security while facilitating legitimate trade and
travel. The evolving vision that is captured here is of an
intertwined frontier whose potential can only be realized
through fulsome cooperation and constant attention by Canada
and the U.S.

COMMON THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS
—————————–

8. (SBU) As dozens of officers representing six agencies
traveled from the Embassy and our seven consulates to visit
border posts and meet with citizens whose lives are affected
by the border, they found a series of common themes:

– When It Works (which It Usually Does), It Works Well;
When It Doesn’t Work, It Is Awful: In general we found a
disconnect between the rhetoric of a “thickening of the
border,” in which longer lines and bureaucratic delays make
border crossings more difficult, and the reality that the
border in most places runs smoothly. There are situations
when the border simply can’t handle the traffic volume,
however. Southbound delays of over two hours at some of the
major bridge crossings in Ontario were reported over the 2007
Labor Day weekend, for example. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) inspection booths were fully staffed, but
heavy volumes of traffic choked approach ways and slowed
movement miles before the bridges. The heavy traffic
resulted from holiday weekend travel, a strong Canadian
dollar, and fabulous back-to-school sales at malls in New
York and Michigan, overwhelming the existing physical
infrastructure at the border crossings. (Comment: The
Canada Border Services Agency, CBSA, reported northbound
delays of from two – three hours as Canadians came home after
Labor Day. End comment.) Those places where thousands of
vehicles are funneled into a narrow border crossing will
require significant investments to make them capable of
handling the crush of people traveling over holidays, or to
witness major sporting or cultural events.

– Each Border Crossing Is Unique: The difference between
small, intimate border crossings in isolated areas of the
Qsmall, intimate border crossings in isolated areas of the
West and upper Northeast, and the industrial style crossings
of the Great Lakes region, is huge. This leads each border
crossing to take on its own distinct personality: bridges
and tunnels are operated by different governance structures,
each crossing has its own infrastructure issues, and
relations among local communities are distinct. Solutions to
border issues should be very flexible to take account of this
great diversity.

– The U.S. and Canada Weigh the Border Differently: To
Canadians, 90% of whom live within 100 miles of the border,
keeping the border open and moving smoothly is a major
national issue, because Canada is one large border community.
This is not true for the United States, where only a
fraction of the population lives near the northern border and
only a few major cities, such as Detroit and Buffalo, are
actually on the border. The relative difference in
prioritization of border issues often makes resolution of
border issues inherently unequal.

OTTAWA 00002035 003 OF 005

– Core Border Priorities also Differ: The most obvious
disconnect between the two countries is in their relative
priorities on the border. For Canada the number one priority
is the free flow of people and goods in both directions. For
America the top priority is security. Canadians see the
border as something to be kept as invisible as possible.
Post 9/11, Americans see the border as a last line of
defense, the final place to check people or things coming
into the country.

– For Both Countries, North-South Beats East-West: The
pull of the border is clear on both sides – an American
living in northern Vermont is more economically integrated
with a Quebecker across the border than with his fellow
countryman in Indiana, while a Canadian in Vancouver would
feel more comfortable with someone from Seattle than with a
Manitoban. Distinct cross-border cultures have been built up
over several centuries and they are highly valued by those
who belong to them, although arguably more by Canadians than
Americans. People on both sides believe these special
relationships are worth preserving.

– Progress or Modernization Has Been Significant, but
Piecemeal: There has been a vast amount of border
modernization by both countries. The largest positive impact
has come from enhanced infrastructure like the new truck
plaza at the Champlain/LaColle crossing south of Montreal.
There have also been significant advances in facilitating
crossing and travel, like combining air, land, and sea
components of the NEXUS trusted traveler program. But the
progress has not been comprehensive and has rarely been part
of a strategic plan, instead depending on local or regional
initiatives.

– Biggest Negative Is Unilateral Initiatives: The most
common refrain we hear from business is, “When are you going
to stop?” Business figures complain about new security
initiatives that make crossings more difficult, or more
costly: the surprise APHIS inspection fee, the Bio-Terrorism
Act, impending WHTI implementation, Hazmat ID for truckers,
etc. At the low end, these unilateral U.S. initiatives that
have not been well explained in Canada lead to frustration
and distrust, at the high end to avoidance of the border. To
Canadians, the trend in the U.S. seems to be moving in the
direction of increasing unilateralism, without advance
consultation with the Canadians, compared to the immediate
post-9/11 period when the joint shared border programs were
launched. We can combat this misperception by increasing the
interaction of U.S. agencies involved in border enforcement
with their Canadian counterparts. Canadians have so far (1)
complained about new programs, but then (2) buckled down and
figured out how to comply with the new requirements.

– Border Threat Is Real but Manageable: The border
threat stems from two key factors: 1) the inability to
police such a wide area of complicated geography, and 2) a
handful of extremists who make use of legal protections to
continue to operate freely in Canada. The issue is
exacerbated by the inability of the U.S. and Canada to fully
Qexacerbated by the inability of the U.S. and Canada to fully
share law enforcement and terrorist information. The best
defense in the face of these realities is better intelligence
and cooperative policing.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MANAGING CHANGE
———————————–

9. (SBU) If there is one key to keeping the border open
without sacrificing the safety of our citizens, it is
managing change — change in infrastructure, change in
border crossing procedures, and change in the nature of
cross-border communities. All must be managed flexibly,
transparently, and inclusively. Emerging from this project
are several recommendations for how we can best manage the
many changes that will face us across the border.

– Keep an Eye on Infrastructure: There are at any given
time dozens of infrastructure projects underway along the
border – from large-scale endeavors such as enhancements to
the Detroit-Windsor bridges, to renovations of small border
crossing posts in rural areas. Canada is fairly strategic

OTTAWA 00002035 004 OF 005

about how these projects are planned and tracked, while the
U.S. side is decentralized. We should consider taking a more
strategic approach to infrastructure, since this will, in
many places; determine how well the border works. A northern
border infrastructure coordinator in Washington could help
coordinate major border infrastructure projects to ensure
they are synchronized, progressing, and successful.

– Keep Staffing Levels Up: Adequate port of entry staffing
is key to facilitating crossings while ensuring security
along the land border. The minimum time needed to process
persons applying to enter the U.S. is fairly fixed. Once a
passenger vehicle reaches the inspection booth, the query
process is oftentimes completed in seconds, not minutes.
However, if lines begin to form long distances from the
inspection booths, and travelers see that only half of the
booths are open, they are bound to be frustrated. There are
simply few ways to cut corners on border staffing, and when
staffing is not adequate, the result is delays. Port of
entry staffing levels must have sufficient flexibility to
cover seasonal variations and shifting travel patterns,
including holidays in both countries. (Comment: Despite the
long backups experienced by Ontario border operators this
past summer, border operators were generally complimentary of
U.S. CBP’s quick response time to fully staff available
booths when backups were forming. And, to be fair to CBP and
CBSA, we understand that high traffic volumes during peak
times may overwhelm existing infrastructure, causing lines to
form even with all booths fully staffed. End comment.)

– Continue to Press for Cooperative Policing: The key
imperative for cross-border security will be continuing to
develop a mechanism for cooperative cross-border law
enforcement. We have scratched the surface, with Integrated
Border Enforcement Teams, Shiprider Proofs of Concept, and
the Cross Border Crime Forum. But all venues to date have
involved either temporary or partial integration. We should
work toward the kind of cooperation and integration of U.S.
and Canadian law enforcement officials that we have had for
military cooperation through NORAD.

– Improve Information Sharing: Improved sharing of
actionable law enforcement information is a key near-term
goal. We currently share threat information but often do not
share the kind of background that would allow the other side
to develop a full threat picture. Part of the difficulty, of
course, is that the Canadian Charter of Rights sets forth
very strict right-to-privacy requirements. Our law
enforcement efforts on both sides of the border would benefit
from a mechanism that would help us to get beyond the fallout
from the Arar affair and engage in a free and continuous
exchange of information on the entire range of cross-border
law enforcement and counter-terrorism issues.

– Improve the Flow of Public Information: Border rumors and
lack of full information about upcoming regulation changes
hurt us. The resulting uncertainty causes citizens to delay
or cancel travel, and leads to back ups at border crossings
Qor cancel travel, and leads to back ups at border crossings
as unprepared travelers do at the customs booth what they
could have done in advance in preparation for travel. We
need new and better ways to communicate changes to border
requirements, which should be announced well in advance and
kept on track once announced. We should aim for a regime of
“no surprises.”

– Finally, Keep Each Other Informed: We should also enhance
our border consultative mechanisms. We have the Permanent
Joint Board of Defense for military cooperation, the
Bilateral Consultative Group for counter-terrorism
cooperation, the Energy Consultative Mechanism for energy
issues, and the International Joint Commission for boundary
water management. Given the complexity of the border and the
many agencies and equities involved, an annual meeting along
the lines of the other successful bilateral mechanisms we
have with Canada could go a long way to bringing a strategic
focus to our management of the border. We might, for
example, enlarge the number of agencies participating in
meetings of CBP’s and CBSA’s Shared Border Accord
Coordinating Committee (SBACC) to include all of those with a
role to play in managing the border. Messages II and III of

OTTAWA 00002035 005 OF 005

this three-part message contain the full report of our
year-long investigation of the U.S.-Canada border in 2007.

Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada &
Mexico) at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap

Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada & Mexico) at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap

WILKINS

 

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#09OTTAWA425 #cablegate Prime Minister announces proposal to expand NAFTA’s government procurement commitments to provinces 09OTTAWA425

Viewing cable 09OTTAWA425, Prime Minister announces proposal to expand NAFTA’s government procurement commitments to provinces

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09OTTAWA425 2009-06-04 20:23 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO0935
PP RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHMT RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0425/01 1552023
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 042023Z JUN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9498
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 1984
RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
 
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000425

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR E, EB/DCT, WHA/EX, WHA/CAN

STATE PASS USTR (SULLIVAN)

COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC (WORD)

TREASURY FOR IA (WEYER)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD EINV EIND PREL PGOV CA
SUBJECT: Prime Minister announces proposal to expand NAFTA’s
government procurement commitments to provinces

Ref: Ottawa 393

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (SBU) Summary: Prime Minister Harper is receiving guarded
support from Canada’s provinces over his proposal to counter “Buy
American” measures by expanding the NAFTA government procurement
chapter. The government hopes such an expansion will secure access
for Canadian suppliers to the U.S. sub-federal procurement market.
However, this strategy would require negotiation on two fronts:
first, the provinces must be persuaded to drop their own
protectionist barriers; and second, the United States and Mexico
must then be persuaded to expand the NAFTA procurement chapter.
Were this to happen, it would be a positive opening of Canadian
markets but would not be a panacea for the disruptions caused by Buy
America provisions. End Summary

Harper’s Response to “Buy American”
———————————–

2. (U) On June 3, Prime Minister Harper announced his intention to
pursue an expansion of sub-federal government procurement
commitments in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Growing Canadian concerns over potential business losses resulting
from “Buy American” provisions in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) and other pending federal
legislation (reftel) prompted Harper’s announcement.

3. (U) Harper stated that while the WTO and NAFTA contain
prohibitions against national preferences for federal level
procurement, they do not apply to provinces and municipalities
(i.e., sub-federal entities). “I believe it would be interesting
for all of our countries to look at dealing with that problem here
in North America,” stated Harper. “Obviously, at a time when we’re
trying to keep borders open internationally, I do think that the
proliferation of domestic preferences in sub-national government
procurement is really problematic. It is part of the creeping
protectionism, not just in the United States, but elsewhere, that we
must avoid to ensure a global recovery.”

4. (U) While Canada has previously resisted formalizing
provincial-level procurement access for foreign suppliers, recent
actions in the context of the planned free trade talks with the
European Union have help ease the way for Harper’s proposal. As a
pre-condition for launching the FTA talks, the EU persuaded Canada
to bring the provinces to the table for procurement talks. Canada’s
Minister of International Trade, Stockwell Day, indicated that the
EU action “really opened the door” to the current federal-provincial
dialogue on the NAFTA.

Day as Provincial Consensus-Builder
———————————–

5. (SBU) Minister Day has been given the job of building consensus
among provinces – with Quebec and Ontario already voicing a degree
of support. One of Day’s challenges is to overcome provincial
reluctance to give up buy-local provisions in their existing
provincial regulations. The Canadian public also tends to be
fiercely protective of social, health, and cultural matters – and an
obvious foreign commercial presence in these areas might trigger a
backlash against Harper’s minority government. While
municipal-level procurement does not appear to be on the table at
Qmunicipal-level procurement does not appear to be on the table at
this stage, the results of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities
(FCM) annual meeting on June 6 (reftel) will likely help shape
federal and provincial thinking on the issue. During the FCM
meeting, more than 1000 municipalities will consider a slate of
actions to counter “Buy American” restrictions.

No pain, no gain
—————-

6. (SBU) Canadian trade watchers suggest that the domestic debate
will hinge on comparing the costs and benefits of new procurement
commitments against the current informal mechanisms governing
provincial procurement. According to Canadian trade lawyer, Simon
Potter, while most provinces already allow U.S. companies to bid on

OTTAWA 00000425 002 OF 002

their contracts, it is a difficult process complicated by a
patchwork of rules, exceptions and protectionist measures.
Responding to the Prime Minister’s announcement, Lawrence Herman,
another Canadian trade lawyer, stated that “It will take a lot of
effort to get the provinces to agree, but it’s the only realistic
way to solve the problem.”

7. (SBU) Comment: Herman’s hope that this will “solve the problem”
raises a tactical issue for us and the Canadians: even were these
negotiations to come to fruition, they would not be a a panacea for
“buy national” provisions on both sides of the border. For one
thing, the offers by states and provinces will be limited by
geographical scope and by sector; for another, municipalities will
not be covered at all. We suggest keeping in mind that this opening
of Canadian markets will be a very positive step for U.S. exporters
and investors but will not put to rest the arguments over “Buy
America” and “Buy Canada” regulations. End comment.

 

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#09OTTAWA434, #cablegate SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO CANADA BY DHS SECRETARY NAPOLITANO

Viewing cable 09OTTAWA434, SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO CANADA BY DHS SECRETARY NAPOLITANO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs.

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol).
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09OTTAWA434 2009-06-05 21:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO2110
OO RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHMT RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0434/01 1562103
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 052103Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9513
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
 

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000434

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DHS FOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV ETRD ECON PTER CA
SUBJECT: SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO CANADA BY DHS SECRETARY NAPOLITANO

1. (SBU) Summary. DHS Secretary Napolitano held productive
meetings in Ottawa on May 27 with PM Harper, National Security
Advisor Morin, Public Safety Minister Van Loan, and Citizenship
Minister Kenney, at which Canadian officials pledged cooperation on
border issues, especially in facing threats from terrorism and
crime, which affect both our countries. She heard concerns from
business leaders that U.S. border measures were hindering trade.
She signed the landmark “Shiprider” agreement — integrated maritime
law enforcement operations — during a stop to the Detroit/Windsor
border on May 26, and announced an agreement on a framework for the
movement of people and goods across the U.S. Canada border during
and following an emergency. Secretary Napolitano and Minister Van
Loan agreed to meet at least twice a year in the future. End
Summary.

The Prime Minister
————————

2. (SBU) During a May 27 visit to Ottawa, Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano met with a range of high level Canadian
officials, accompanied by Charge d’Affaires Breese. The meeting
with Prime Minister Stephen Harper focused on the implementation of
the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), Canadian concerns
about U.S. security measures at the border, and land preclearance.
PM Harper reiterated his statement from the joint press conference
with President Obama on February 19 that threats to the United
States and Canada are shared. However, he expressed concern about
U.S. statements regarding “parity” between the Mexican and Canadian
borders. He highlighted Canadian perceptions that the borders are
significantly different and insisted that they should not be treated
the same. The Prime Minister stated his overall security concerns
were similar to those of the United States, but underlined
particular concern about any emerging nexus between organized crime
and terrorism.

National Security Advisor
——————————–

3. (SBU) In a separate meeting, National Security Advisor
Marie-Lucie Morin emphasized that the interagency group of Deputy
Ministers she leads is focusing on borders and all modes of entry
into Canada, not just the land border. She pointed out that
Canada’s air and sea border security directly impacts the U.S.
because of the shared land border. She expressed Canada’s interest
in undertaking joint threat assessments. She also expressed her
belief that intelligence sharing between our countries is “back on
track after some unfortunate cases;” CDA Breese commented that the
Embassy still sees significant problems. She confirmed that
Minister Van Loan has the broad policy lead for information sharing
issues on behalf of the Government of Canada, but that those issues
also involve Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Justice Canada,
Transport Canada, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade. Ms. Morin pledged that Canada would like to
work with the United States on security cooperation with Mexico, and
expressed appreciation for the strong U.S.-Canada-Mexico
collaboration to address the recent H1N1 virus, underscoring the
value of having protocols in place to address similar situations.

4. (SBU) Ms. Morin commented that a secure, stable border is
important and that, among the serious threats we face, the economic
threat is high as well. Ms. Morin said she would lead a delegation
of senior officials to Washington in September; Secretary
Napolitano offered to have DHS officials (specifically DAS Silver)
QNapolitano offered to have DHS officials (specifically DAS Silver)
work with her staff and State Department officials on an exchange of
letters to set up an agenda for this visit. Ms. Morin asked that
DHS and her office work together to establish a set of priority
issues for discussion at the August 2009 North American Leaders
Summit (NALS). She emphasized that collaboration needs to focus on
concrete issues and deliver rapid results.

Public Safety Canada
—————————

5. (SBU) In a meeting on May 27 following the shared Ambassador
Bridge tour, signing of the Shiprider agreement (see para 14), and
joint press conference in Detroit the day before, Secretary
Napolitano met with Public Safety Minister Peter Van Loan in Ottawa.
She assured Minister Van Loan of DHS’ readiness for the
implementation of WHTI. She and Van Loan agreed to advance
discussions at the senior officials’ level on developing a joint
threat assessment, potentially including the private sector in
particular on threats to critical infrastructure and consequence
management issues. Minister Van Loan strongly urged the reopening
of discussions on land preclearance, but Secretary Napolitano
cautioned that potential efficiencies were unclear and suggested
instead discussion on other outstanding preclearance-related issues,
including private aircraft, marine and rail, and cargo. Deputy
Minister Suzanne Hurtubise said she had recently completed

OTTAWA 00000434 002 OF 003

consultations with other departments and that Canada would be
willing to discuss General Aviation/private aircraft preclearance.

6. (SBU) Minister Van Loan agreed to look into the issues on an
expedited basis raised by CDA Breese, notably the possible provision
by Canada of status under the air preclearance agreement to CBP
personnel working in Container Security Initiative Ports in Canada
and CBP officers conducting preclearance for ferries at Canadian
terminals. The Secretary and the Minister agreed to have CBP and
CBSA conduct a review of the trusted shipper programs — C-TPAT
(CBP) and PIP (Canada) — to see if they could be further
integrated. Minister Van Loan indicated his preference to pursue
with Canadian airlines obtaining “informed consent” from passengers
overflying the United States to provide their information to the
United States for Secure Flight. The Secretary suggested looking at
subsets of data on arriving passengers that we could share.
Minister Van Loan discussed collaborating on issues relating to
domestic radicalization and suggested Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (CSIS) should meet with DHS officials to discuss outreach
they have done to diverse populations in Canada. The Secretary and
the Minister agreed that the two departments should work together on
cybersecurity. They agreed to meet again in late October/November
2009 — and at least twice a year thereafter — and expressed the
hope of seeing substantial advancement of specific elements of the
joint agenda at that time.

7. (SBU) Following their meeting, the Secretary and the Minister
conducted a joint press conference at which they announced agreement
on a framework for the movement of people and goods across the
border during and following an emergency. They also released a
joint border statement, in which they outlined six shared goals that
they would work toward during their agree-upon twice-yearly
meetings. The goals included developing joint threat and risk
assessments, advancing initiatives to manage risk while facilitating
the movement of legitimate goods and people, sharing information to
prevent people or goods that threaten our safety from entering
either country or crossing the border, expanding integrated law
enforcement operations along the shared border and waterways, and
exploring models for joint or shared border facilities, equipment
and technology as well as cross-designation of personnel as
appropriate.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)
——————————————— ——–

8. (SBU) In a separate meeting, Minister for Citizenship,
Immigration, and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney and the Secretary
discussed immigration, asylum and refugee programs and processes,
and ways to share additional information to prevent criminals and
terrorists from entering our immigration or refugee systems. (This
was the first time that a DHS Secretary had met with an immigration
minister.) Minister Kenney emphasized Canada’s desire to look
closely at visa screening and security in its immigration program.
He discussed challenges in Canada’s refugee and asylum system, in
particular high numbers of “inland refugee claims” (those made by
immigrants who travel to Canada by other means and then claim asylum
after arriving), stating that he was “very concerned about abuse in
this system.” He admitted that 55% of these inland refugee claims
are rejected, but because of appeal delays and applications for
Qare rejected, but because of appeal delays and applications for
humanitarian exceptions, many are not removed for many years.
Minister Kenney explained that CIC was preparing a package of
reforms to the system to address these delays and increase resources
for removals that would be put forward in the fall.

9. (SBU) Minister Kenney admitted that Canada was behind the
United States and the United Kingdom in its fingerprint program, and
said that CIC was looking to accelerate its implementation in Canada
ahead of the current 2013 target date. CDA Breese offered to host
the Minister at the U.S. Embassy’s Consular Section to view the visa
and fingerprint process at his convenience. Deputy Minister Fadden
raised concerns about the difficulties of sharing information,
including biometric information under the current MOUs between the
United States and Canada which predate both the creation of CIC and
DHS. The Secretary and the Minister agreed to put together an
appropriate group of officials to discuss the MOU and the legal and
policy impediments to sharing information for immigration and
security screening purposes on a more systematic basis, with a goal
of updating the MOU.

10. (SBU) Minister Kenney expressed interest in the U.S. Enhanced
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program for Visa Waiver
entrants. He admitted that Canada needs to do more in screening
visitors from Visa Waiver countries. The Secretary offered to host
CIC officials in Washington with the DHS ESTA team to brief them.
Minister Kenney also discussed differences in admissibility criteria
(in particular on national security issues), stating there have been

OTTAWA 00000434 003.2 OF 003

cases where the United States has admitted persons Canada has kept
out, and objecting that Canada is somehow “softer on immigration.”
(Comment: The reference was to British MP George Galloway, who was
denied entry to Canada because of his support for Hamas but was
admitted to the U.S. for a speaking tour. End Comment) The
Secretary and the Minister agreed to have a group of officials meet
to develop a matrix to compare and contrast the screening process
and admissibility criteria between the U.S. and Canada and report
back.

11. (SBU) Minister Kenney expressed his strong desire to enhance
information sharing between Canada and the United States, and
emphasized that his government is ready to explore legislative
changes to make greater information sharing possible. CIC has asked
that DHS alert CIC when ICE is preparing significantly to ramp-up
interior immigration enforcement actions, as U.S. enforcement
activities impact Canada’s refugee claimant numbers. The Secretary
asked in return that CIC alert DHS to any anticipated changes in
immigration policies related to Haiti. Minister Kenney asked to
meet with the Secretary on an annual basis to further the
relationship and ensure coordination and communication on
immigration and visa policy issues, which she agreed would be
useful.

Private Sector
—————–

12. (SBU) At a May 26 dinner hosted by Canadian-American Business
Council (CABC) Executive Director Maryscott (“Scotty”) Greenwood,
the Secretary had an opportunity to meet with CABC board members
from cross-border Canadian business associations and some Canadian
politicians, including Senator Pamela Wallin and Member of
Parliament Bev Shipley, as well as former Canadian Ambassador to
Washington Michael Kergin. Ambassador Kergin noted his belief that
the “future of cooperation is real transparency in our intelligence
and security agencies.” Janet Lambert, former President of
BIOTECanada, noted that improved security can have economic benefits
for any sector, and common policies between the countries on
security measures would be helpful. She emphasized there does not
need to be a trade-off between security and trade. Ron Covais,
President for the Americas of Lockheed Martin, recommended that DHS
review recommendations made under the North American Competitiveness
Council (NACC), a trilateral private sector council of CEOs from
Canada, Mexico, and the United States, formed several years ago to
advise the leaders of the three countries under the Security and
Prosperity Partnership (SPP). He suggested some of these
recommendations may be worth considering and that the government
should ask the private sector to see how technology can make it
happen.

13. (SBU) Shirley Ann George of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce
recommended a joint set of recommendations that the Canadian and
U.S. Chambers of Commerce developed with “practical ideas” for
facilitating trade along the border. Others advised that “language
matters” when speaking to the Canadian public, and suggested that
“sovereign border” was a better phrase from the Canadian perspective
than “real border” and that “convergence” was a better term than
“harmonization” between U.S. and Canadian policies. Senator Wallin
suggested that the current government under PM Harper and in
particular Minister Kenney were more open to discussing issues of
immigration policy between our two nations than was previously the
Qimmigration policy between our two nations than was previously the
case. Dave Leach of Greyhound described the difficulties his
company has with regular bus service at Buffalo; the Secretary asked
for more details to learn whether the issue is occasional or
systemic. (DAS Silver and DAS Kraninger subsequently met with Mr.
Leach and obtained get additional information for follow up.)

Agreements
—————

14. (SBU) The Secretary and Minister Van Loan, in a public event
on May 26 at the Detroit/Windsor border crossing, signed the
long-awaited “Shiprider” agreement, which will enable integrated
maritime law enforcement operations to deal with cross-border crime.
They also announced an agreement on a framework for the movement of
people and goods across the U.S. Canada border during and following
an emergency.

15. (U) DHS Attach has cleared this message.

BREESE

 

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#10OTTAWA49 #cablegate Transforming the Canadian Forces: The Spirit is Willing… 10OTTAWA49

Viewing cable 10OTTAWA49, Transforming the Canadian Forces: The Spirit is Willing…

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10OTTAWA49 2010-02-04 15:58 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Ottawa

Appears in these articles:

VZCZCXRO6319
RR RUEHSL
DE RUEHOT #0049/01 0351608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041558Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0336
INFO ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
 

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000049

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR WHA/CAN, EUR/RPM, AND INR
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO APP WINNIPEG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/04
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS MARR CA
SUBJECT: Transforming the Canadian Forces: The Spirit is Willing…

REF: 08 OTTAWA 649; 09 OTTAWA 196; 10 OTTAWA 29

CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Bellard, Political Minister Counselor,
Department of State, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C/NF) Summary. The Canadian Forces are severely stretched and
the ambitious goals set by the Canada First Defence Strategy
continue to encounter delays and budget constraints that will limit
the scope of the projected transformation of the forces. The
government of Prime Minister Harper may refocus available military
resources closer to home, at the expense of future expeditionary
missions such as Afghanistan, despite concern that Canada’s
influence on the world stage will diminish significantly
post-Afghanistan. End summary.

“”Canada is Back”" – or is it?

2. (C/NF) The ruling Conservative Party of Canada under Prime
Minister Stephen Harper has made military modernization a core
campaign pledge in its successful 2006 and 2008 elections, while
failing to win a majority of seats in the House of Commons in
either election. The party’s slogan of “”Canada is back”"
nonetheless resonated well with voters, and pride in the Canadian
Forces (CF) is high, despite declining support for Canada’s combat
mission in Afghanistan, now slated to end in 2011 according to the
terms of a March 2008 House of Commons bipartisan motion.

3. (C/NF) The ambitious “”Canada First Defence Strategy”" (CFDS),
first announced in May 2008 (ref b), was designed to increase the
readiness of the CF by providing greater resources for training and
maintenance, as well modernizing CF equipment with USD 15.4 billion
in major new procurement programs. Parliament approved CN 5.2
billion in July 2009 to renew the army’s fleet of land combat
vehicles, after the Chief of the Land Staff, Lt. General Andrew
Leslie, publicly claimed that the army was at its breaking point
and might need to take a one-year operational break at the
conclusion of the Afghanistan mission. High casualty rates among
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan had been attributable in part to
inferior armored vehicles and the absence of helicopter medivac for
wounded soldiers. General Leslie subsequently retracted his
one-year time-out proposal, citing successes in procurement of key
items, including helicopters.

4. (C/NF) According to media reports, leaked documents from the
Department of Public Works and Government Services to the
Department of National Defence (DND) recently announced that a
multi-billion dollar purchase of Close Combat Vehicles (CCV) for
the army had been put on hold. This is the latest in a string of
delays, setbacks, and shifting budget priorities that have beset
the government’s plan to transform and modernize the CF. These
delays in procurement and shifts in priorities come at a time when
the Canadian Forces are severely overstretched by missions in
Afghanistan and Haiti as well as major security operations in
support of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. There is speculation that
the CCV program was put on hold in part because some within DND see less need for it now, given the impending end of the Afghanistan
mission. DND is reportedly scrambling to find over CN 400 million
in savings in order to fund other, higher priority projects.

5. (C/NF) The CFDS had also pledged major purchases of C-17
strategic and C-130J tactical airlift aircraft, as well as CH-47
Chinook helicopters, 1300 medium-sized logistic trucks (down from
an earlier goal of 2300), and Joint Support Ships and Arctic
Offshore Patrol Ships for the Navy. The latter program is an
example of a requirement driven by political rather than military
imperatives, since the Navy did not request these patrol ships.
The Conservatives have nonetheless long found domestic political
capital in asserting Canada’s “”Arctic Sovereignty”" (ref c). On the
positive side of the CFDS ledger, the C-17, C-130J, and CH-47

OTTAWA 00000049 002 OF 002

procurements have been executed. The C-17s have been delivered,
and C-130J and CH-47 programs are underway. The first C-130J
delivery to Canada will occur in May 2010.

6. (C/NF) Severe budgetary constraints are likely to continue to
plague CFDS programs. The strategy was predicated on a steadily
increasing funding stream over a 20-year period, which is likely to
prove unsustainable. Personnel costs constitute 52 percent of the
CF’s budget. While this figure is lower than some other NATO
militaries, it limits funds available for R&D and equipment
purchases.

Manpower issues

7. (C/NF) Manpower and recruitment targets set by CFDS have been
steadily revised downward. The latest goal is to increase the size
of the regular forces from the current 66,000 to 70,000 and the
reserves from 25,000 to 30,000. Even the most optimistic
projection predicts an increase of 1000 personnel each for the
regular forces and the reserves by 2011-12, for a total force size
of 95,000. However, current rates of attrition, especially within
the NCO ranks, remain high (over 9 percent in 2008-9), and
recruitment continues to lag behind target figures. The present
overstretch within the CF is such that troops recently rotated out
of Afghanistan are being reactivated for deployment to Haiti, even
though the units were in their mandated 12 months of “”dwell time”"
between deployments. Cuts in intake of new recruits were announced
at the end of the year as part of the DND effort to cover budget
shortfalls. Training of those recruits who do join is constrained
by the deployment to Afghanistan of experienced NCOs devoted to
training the Afghan Security Forces.

8. (C/NF) According to LTG Angus Watt, former Chief of the Air
Staff, there are currently only 1350 trained and available pilots
of a desired manning figure of 1600 in late 2008; he lamented this
“”pipeline air force.”" While the Air Force has made some progress
in closing this gap, the immediate demands of the Haiti mission
meant there were insufficient numbers of trained pilots available
to fly the airlift missions required for the next rotation of CF
units into Afghanistan, potentially reducing the operational
effectiveness of the CF. Depending upon its duration and scope,
the Haiti relief mission could exacerbate the already-high
operational tempo of the forces, contributing to strains on
personnel and potentially worsening the attrition problem.

Comment

9. (C/NF) PM Harper has set an assertive course for Canadian
foreign policy, declaring that “”Canada is back”" on the world scene.
However, his ambitions for Canada may exceed his grasp, however, as
changes in demography, economic constraints, difficulties in
procurement, and competing priorities combine to limit his
government’s ability to achieve this sweeping military
transformation. The effect is likely to be that military resources
will be redirected, defending “”sovereignty”" in the Arctic and
other Canadian interests, at the expense of future post-Afghanistan
expeditionary missions. Senior Canadian military officials as well
as media pundits have already begun to express concern at a likely
loss of Canada’s influence with the U.S. and NATO after the end of
Canada’s Afghanistan mission, but so far this concern does not
appear to be on the Prime Minister’s or the Conservative Party’s
radar scope.
JACOBSON

 

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#10OTTAWA106 #cablegate CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER LAYS OUT G8, G20 PRIORITIES

Viewing cable 10OTTAWA106, CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER LAYS OUT G8, G20 PRIORITIES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10OTTAWA106 2010-01-28 21:32 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHOT #0106/01 0282133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 282132Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0321
INFO ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0022
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0009
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0009
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0012
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0009
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0009
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0006

 

UNCLAS OTTAWA 000106

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL ECON ETRD CA
SUBJECT: CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER LAYS OUT G8, G20 PRIORITIES

REF: OTTAWA 100

1. (SBU) Summary: In Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Harper set out
his agenda as host of the June 2010 G8 and G20 summits, focusing
primarily on financial sector reform, stimulus programs, and global
trade and growth. He also underscored a continued important role
for the G8 and its “close cooperation of friends and like-minded
allies” in promoting democracy, development, peace, and security,
and reiterated his intention to launch a major initiative to
improve maternal and child health in the developing world (reftel).
At home, his party’s poll numbers continue to slide. End summary.

“REAL RESULTS” OVER “LOFTY PROMISES”

2. (U) Prime Minister Stephen Harper outlined his priorities as
host of G8 and G20 summits in Muskoka (Huntsville) and Toronto,
Ontario in June in a keynote address to the World Economic Forum in
Davos on January 28. He identified financial sector reform,
stimulus programs, and global trade and growth as priority areas
for the G20 under the theme “Recovery and New Beginnings.” The PM
pledged that Canada would use its leadership role at both the G8
and G20 summits to focus on global challenges, push for “real
results” over “lofty promises.” The following is a link to the
full speech: http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3096

G8 LEADERSHIP IN DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

3. (U) In his keynote address, PM Harper underscored a continued
important global role for the G8 in promoting democracy,
development, and peace and security. He argued that the G8 should
show leadership in combating the “daunting threats” of terrorism,
piracy, climate change, and nuclear proliferation, which required
“the close cooperation of friends and like-minded allies.” He
pressed the G8 to live up to commitments on foreign aid, noting
that Canada had already doubled its aid to Africa and was “on
track” to double foreign aid in 2010. He called for a new G8 focus
on maternal and child health in the world’s poorest regions, a plan
he had first outlined at home on January 26 (reftel). He stated
that Canada had “indications” that “some” other G8 partners “share
and are receptive” to this proposal. Underscoring that it was
“time to mobilize,” he called on G8 partners to demonstrate a
“unity of purpose” and to “replace grand good intentions with
substantive acts of human good will.” He insisted that
“accountability…is the prerequisite for progress.”

FINANCIAL REFORM, STIMULUS AND TRADE

4. (U) For the G20, PM Harper highlighted financial sector
reform, the continued need for stimulus programs, and enhancing
global trade and growth. He praised the “Canada Advantage” of a
stable national financial sector, and supported the need to
strengthen financial regulation, while warning against “punitive”
and “arbitrary” bank regulation. He advocated national standards
subject to international peer review. Arguing that the global
economic recovery remained “a mile wide and an inch thick,” he
counseled the need to stay the course on stimulus programs, while
cautioning that it was not too early to start thinking of an “exit
strategy.” PM Harper underscored the importance of avoiding
protectionism as central to economic growth and eliminating
poverty. He called for states to exercise “enlightened
sovereignty” — “the “natural extension of enlightened
self-interest” – and for “practical, durable solutions.” He noted
that the G20 meeting in Toronto should be “less about new
agreements than accountability for existing ones.”

POLITICAL CHALLENGES AT HOME

5. (U) PM Harper’s focus on the global economy coincided with the
release of three national polls that pegged the ruling Conservative
Party in a virtual tie with the Official Opposition Liberal Party,
at between 31 and 33 percent of voters. Throughout the early fall,
the Conservatives had enjoyed as much as a ten-point lead over the
Liberals. However, Conservative support began to slip in November
over allegations that the government knew of possible mistreatment
of Afghan detainees turned over by Canadian Forces to Afghan
authorities, and fell sharply after PM Harper convinced the
Governor General to prorogue (suspend) Parliament in late December
(for the second time in a year) until March 3. All three
opposition parties have alleged that the government acted primarily
to shut down parliamentary hearings on the detainee issue.

COMMENT

6. (SBU) PMr Harper has set down some markers for his broad
economic agenda, looking ahead to the federal budget in March and
to key G8 and G20 objectives. He is using Canada’s relative
financial sector health to stake out a position of economic
leadership globally. He may try to use this to reinforce Canada’s
position in the G8, even as others look increasingly to the G20 for
coordination on global issues. End comment.
JACOBSON

 

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#10OTTAWA84 #cablegate CANADA POISED TO TIGHTEN CRIME SENTENCING RULES 10OTTAWA84

Viewing cable 10OTTAWA84, CANADA POISED TO TIGHTEN CRIME SENTENCING RULES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10OTTAWA84 2010-01-22 20:30 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXYZ0013
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHOT #0084/01 0222033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 222030Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0300
INFO ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

 
UNCLAS OTTAWA 000084

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER CA
SUBJECT: CANADA POISED TO TIGHTEN CRIME SENTENCING RULES

REF: TORONTO 54; TORONTO 62

1. (SBU) Summary: Although PM Harper continues to criticize
sentencing provisions in Canada that permit terrorists and
criminals, including at least one convicted “Toronto 18″ terrorist,
to obtain enhanced sentencing credit for time served in pre-trial
custody, Parliament actually passed a government bill to end
in-custody credit in October 2009. The government, for its own
as-yet-undisclosed reasons, will not enact it until February. In
2009, the government passed only three out of its 17 justice bills.
The Conservatives continue to trumpet their crime agenda and to
highlight it as one of the main policy planks in the upcoming new
session of Parliament. End summary.

BLAME THE LIBERALS…

2. (U) At a scheduled stop in Truro, Nova Scotia to make an
infrastructure funding announcement on January 21, Prime Minister
Stephen Harper unusually volunteered during a press scrum to answer
a question reporters had not even asked: how did he react to
public “outrage” over the latest sentence handed down in the
“Toronto 18″ terror case? (On January 20 a Toronto court had
sentenced Amin Mohamed Durrani to one day in prison for his role in
the plot after the judge reduced Durrani’s 7.5 year prison sentence
for time served – ref a.) PM Harper said that he understood
Canadians’ shock. Without addressing the specifics of the Durrani
sentence, he criticized current sentencing rules that award two-for
one or even – though rarely – three-for-one credit for time in
pre-trial custody. He underscored that his government would end
the practice and would make criminals serve more time after
conviction.

3. (U) PM Harper said that “unfortunately” a new Canadian would
not apply in the latest terror sentencing. He complained that “it
took us a long time” to get the law through Parliament, given that
his minority government faced obstruction “in both [legislative]
houses…every step of the way.” He credited minority Conservative
senators for fighting “pitched battles” with Liberal senators to
push the bill through, arguing that Liberal senators “kept gutting”
the legislation. The struggle, he said, underscored the need for
more Conservative senators “to ensure that laws move faster in the
future.” There are currently five vacancies in the Senate that the
PM may fill before Parliament returns on March 3. The appointments
would give the Conservatives a 51 to 49 plurality over the Liberals
in the 105-seat Senate as well as an effective, but not absolute
majority in the chamber for the first time since the Conservatives
took office in 2006. In a televised speech the following day to
the federal Conservative caucus on January 22, PM Harper claimed
that his government’s tough-on-crime agenda had made Canadians
“safer.”

TRUTH IN SENTENCING

4. (U) The federal government had introduced a “Truth in
Sentencing Act” (C-25) to eliminate pre-trial credits in March
2009. The bill provided the courts with sentencing guidance and
ended credit for time served for all but exceptional cases.
Specifically, the legislation capped credit for time in custody at
a 1:1 ratio, with a ratio of up to 1.5:1 only where circumstances
justified it and where courts could explain it. The bill
eliminated extra credit under any circumstances for individuals
detained because of their criminal record or because they violated
bail.

5. (U) Impetus for the bill came from an agreement reached during
meetings of justice ministers at the federal, provincial and
territorial levels in 2006 and 2007. Under Canada’s correctional
system, defendants are held in provincial remand facilities prior
to trial, conviction, and sentencing. The federal government has
argued that some prisoners “game” the system by dragging out time
in pre-trial custody to reduce their sentences and thereby clog
remand facilities and courts. Some legal experts have argued,
however, that the government’s new tougher crime laws and court
inefficiencies are causing the remand backlog.

C-25 NOT A LAGGARD

6. (U) In practice, the Truth in Sentencing Act proved to be one
of the speedier bills to pass in 2009. The bill took only seven
months to pass both the House of Commons and the Senate —
including the three month summer recess. The government introduced
17 justice bills in 2009, of which only three — C-25 the Truth in
Sentencing bill, C-14 to stiffen sentencing for offences committed
in connection with organized crime, and S-4 to prevent identity
theft — passed into law. High-profile law-and-order bills on the
government’s “safe streets” agenda — including bills to raise
sentences for major crime, eliminate sentencing discounts for
multiple murders, and deny access to early parole for first and
second degree murderers — were lost following the prorogation
(suspension) of Parliament on December 31, which terminated all
incomplete legislation. Three justice bills died in the late
stages of process in the Senate.

7. (U) The Truth in Sentencing bill spent just over two months in
the House of Commons and passed without amendment on June 8. It
spent four months in the Senate (including the recess). In all, the
Senate took only six working weeks to complete all stages (first,
second, and third readings, as well as committee hearings) of the
bill. During the hearings, Liberal senators had initially amended
the bill to restore credit for time served to a maximum of 1.5:1
for pre-trial custody and 2:1 where circumstances warranted in
order to preserve judicial discretion. However, Conservative
senators managed to defeat the amendments (44:30) and to pass the
original version of the bill on October 21. Reportedly, Liberal
Leader Michael Ignatieff insisted privately that the party not be
seen as “soft on crime,” prompting some Liberal Senators to absent
themselves from the vote. C-25 received Royal Assent (the final
legislative stage) on October 22. The bill was not affected by
prorogation of Parliament on December 31, 2009.

PASSED, YET NOT ENACTED…

8. (U) Canadian legislation carries a coming-into-force provision
that varies with each bill. In the case of C-25, the bill comes
into force “on a day to be fixed by the Governor-in-Council,”
effectively, by cabinet order. According to contacts in the
Justice Minister’s office, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) told
them only on January 22 that PMO had set the coming-into-force date
for February 22, 2010 — four months after the bill received Royal
Assent.

9. (SBU) Comment: The Conservatives have used the crime agenda
to great effect, making it an essential part of their “brand,” in
spite of the fact that they have not actually passed most of their
proposed crime and security legislation. The PMO apparently
provided no explanation why it will end up waiting four months to
enact its own sentencing credit law, but the delay has not
prevented the PM from using crime — and the bill — as a partisan
issue and to prep for imminent Senate appointments.
JACOBSON

 

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#03OTTAWA374 #cablegate AMBASSADOR’S LUNCH WITH TRANSPORT MINISTER 03OTTAWA374

Viewing cable 03OTTAWA374, AMBASSADOR’S LUNCH WITH TRANSPORT MINISTER

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Every cable message consists of three parts:

  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol).
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03OTTAWA374 2003-02-06 20:50 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ottawa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
 

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000374
SIPDIS
STATE FOR OES-JULIE KARNER; WHA/CAN-PATRICIA NORMAN AND
ERIC RUNNING
STATE FOR EB/TRA-JOHN BYERLY, SUSAN PARSON AND DEB ELLIOT
USDOT FOR JEFF SHANE AND MARY STREET
OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR CHRIS HORNBARGER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAIR SENV ECON CA
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S LUNCH WITH TRANSPORT MINISTER
COLLENETTE

¶1. (U) THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE, BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE TREAT ACCORDINGLY.

SUMMARY

———

¶2. (SBU) Transport Minister Collenette indicated to
Ambassador on January 31 that the GOC is ready to start
“exploratory talks” on further aviation liberalization with
the United States. Collenette admitted that his government
sees little in cargo co-terminalization for Canada – too many
small cargo jobs would be lost and Hamilton’s future as the
cargo hub in Canada would be threatened. He suggested two
longer-range topics: how to deal with the EU and what the
“North American air zone” is likely to be ten years from now.
When pressed, however, Collenette said that there was no
aviation issue that the GOC would preclude from discussion.
In sum, talks should start with no preconditions. After all,
the Deputy Transport Minister added, in the two years leading
up to the current Open Skies agreement, there were
far-ranging talks that helped to lay the groundwork for the
quick successful agreement we did reach. It seems we are
ready to embark on a similar period now, Ranger concluded.

¶3. (SBU) On other issues, Collenette agreed with the USG that
the European Commission’s recommendation to have Galileo use
the same frequencies as those used by the military makes no
sense and the GOC will support our efforts to counter the EC.
There was also a brief discussion of infrastructure issues
at major land border crossings, with Collenette remarking
that more inspectors are needed to help reduce line-ups.
End
Summary.

¶4. (U) Canadian Minister of Transport David Collenette hosted
Ambassador Cellucci over lunch on January 31. His Deputy
Minister Louis Ranger and Chief of Staff Sue Roland joined
Collenette. DCM and Econ MinCouns accompanied the Ambassador.

Galileo

———

¶5. (SBU) Ambassador began the working lunch with a short
explanation of why the USG is deeply concerned with the
European Commission’s recommendation that Galileo uses the
same frequencies as those used by the military. The Minister
said he was very familiar with the issue and could not agree
more with the US position. While he does not have the lead
in Cabinet on this, other ministers are aware of the problem
and all are united that the Europeans should abandon it.

Homeland Security

—————–

¶6. (SBU) Collenette then went on to say that he and other
senior GOC officials are quite anxious to get to know the new
USG Homeland Security team. At various times during the
lunch, the Minister explained the excellent state of working
relations with USG officials over the years and his desire
(along with other Cabinet members) to establish the same with
Homeland Security. Ambassador encouraged Collenette in this
regard, but suggested he wait until after March 1 to allow
DHS time to complete its first organizational tasks.

Aviation

———

¶7. (SBU) Then a long discussion of aviation issues ensued.
The Ambassador started with suggesting that exploratory
discussions of where we might make further steps in
liberalization could start. “We ought to start talking,” the
Ambassador said. In response to Collenetee’s questions, the
Ambassador acknowledged that cabotage remains a tough issue
for us. The Ambassador then highlighted the benefits to both
sides of cargo co-terminalization. Collenette described the
benefits of the current cargo system – small Canadian
carriers, operating out of the hub in Hamilton – and how if
Canada were to grant co-terminalization, these jobs would be
lost and the Hamilton hub (now the largest cargo hub in
Canada) will cease to exist. The uproar just caused by
Culture Minister Sheila Copps (MP from Hamilton) would be
enough on its own to stop co-terminalization in its tracks.
While later admitting to the Ambassador that real benefits
would accrue to small and medium size Canadian business from
such a liberalization, the political costs would just outweigh any benefits, he concluded.

¶8. (SBU) That said, Collenette then went on to describe the
benefits of the open skies agreement of several years ago.
Canadian carriers were the big winners (which they never
thought they would be – at one point they even asked
Transport for a 15 year phase in period, Collenette
chuckled), and while the issues now before us are tough nuts
to crack, both sides should be prepared to talk. Air Canada
is “very competitive” and therefore would benefit from
further liberalization, explained the Minister. However, the
smaller Canadian carriers, such as West Jet, “could go
belly-up.” Louis Ranger said that before Open Skies was
successfully negotiated, there were at least two years of
preliminary meetings. Ranger wondered if we were not at the
same starting point right now – while both sides sees little
interest in catering to the other’s needs, now is the time to
start “exploratory talks.” When pressed by the Ambassador
for advice, the Minister was unable to suggest any Canadian
business group whose endorsement of further liberalization
would give the Liberal Government “political cover.” In
fact, Collenette opined, the probable successor to the
current PM – Paul Martin – is probably less likely to support
further liberalization (“more nationalistic”) than the
present administration. Two specific agenda suggestions of
the Minister were: how to deal with the EU, and what the
“North American air zone” is likely to look like ten years
from now.

(Note: in a February 5 meeting with senior UPS officials, the
Ambassador asked them about the effects of liberalizing air
cargo on the future of the Hamilton hub. They quickly
replied that UPS had invested quite a bit in Hamilton and it
would continue to be an important part of UPS’s cargo
operations. In fact, they said that if liberalization were
reached, Hamilton would likely to grow in investment and
jobs. Toronto Airport has too many flight restrictions and
no room for cargo expansion. End Note)

St. Lawrence Seaway

——————-

¶9. (SBU) Ranger then switched topics to the St. Lawrence
Seaway. There was a request made to the IJC to investigate
deepening of the Seaway – it was to cost US$20 million – half
paid by each government. Where did it stand? We did not
know, but said we would get back to the Minister. Collenette
said that he recently had meetings with the Georgian Bay
residents who are very concerned about water levels.

Border infrastructure

——————–

¶10. (SBU) A short discussion of truck and road issues ensued,
with Collenette explaining that Windsor, Ontario is not
really interested in increasing truck traffic – and no
interest in expanding current infrastructure. Rather, said
the Minister, US Customs needs to increase the number of
inspectors in the booths – at present Collenette said the GOC
estimate the U.S. booths run at only 55% of capacity.
Ambassador replied that Customs has, in fact, hired more
inspectors, but those extra folks are now only working their
way through the training cycles. Both agreed we need to keep
our options open regarding use of the Detroit-Windsor
railroad tunnel and more highways.

¶11. (U) Collenette concluded the luncheon by explaining he
will be at an “inter-modal” conference in Denver in April
during which he will make a keynote speech. He is also on
the board of the International Center at Stanford, and hoped
to travel to Stanford around the time of the Denver meeting.

KELLY

 

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#10OTTAWA126 #cablegate CANADA: CONSERVATIVES GAIN CONTROL OF SENATE 10OTTAWA126

Viewing cable 10OTTAWA126, CANADA: CONSERVATIVES GAIN CONTROL OF SENATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10OTTAWA126 2010-02-01 20:51 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXYZ0002OO RUEHWEBDE RUEHOT #0126/01 0322052ZNR UUUUU ZZHO 012051Z FEB 10FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWATO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0325INFO ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 
UNCLAS OTTAWA 000126
SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/ATAGS: PGOV CA

SUBJECT: CANADA: CONSERVATIVES GAIN CONTROL OF SENATE

REF: 08 OTTAWA 1577; 09 OTTAWA 909; OTTAWA 84

1. (SBU) Summary: Prime Minister Harper has gained effective control of the Senate in the next session of Parliament following the appointment of five new Conservative Senators, which gives his party a working plurality in the upper house for the first time.The shift should strengthen the Conservatives’ ability to expedite passage of their policy agenda — particularly on key crime and justice issues — and increase chances for limited Senate reform.The Conservatives will take over as Senate committee chairs when Parliament resumes on March 3. The new balance of power allows the Prime Minister to put a Conservative stamp on the institution now,while also ensuring a strong Conservative influence for years to come.
End summary.

CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE IN THE RED CHAMBER

2. (U) Upon the recommendation of Prime Minister Stephen Harper on January 29, Governor General Michaelle Jean appointed five new Conservative Senators (see para six for details). After long opposing appointment of senators absent some sort of provincial elections, PM Harper began naming Conservative Senators in December2008 (ref a); he has now named a total of 33. When Parliament returns on March 3, Conservative Senators will have a plurality of51 seats over 49 Liberals in the 105-seat upper chamber. There are also five Independents, most of who tend to vote with the government. If he remains in office until year’s end, PM Harper will have the opportunity to replace one Conservative and two Liberal Senators facing mandatory retirement at age 75. The Conservatives will also gain control of Senate committee chairs after March 3, once the committees reconstitute following the December prorogation (ref b).

FULL AHEAD ON ANTI-CRIME AGENDA

3. (U) In a statement introducing the new Senators, PM Harper explicitly linked the new appointments with his government’s tough-on-crime agenda, which he identified as “one of its highest priorities.” He argued that the opposition had “abused their Senate majority by obstructing and eviscerating law and order measures that are urgently needed and strongly supported by Canadians.” He underscored that the appointees were “committed to community safety and justice for the victims of crime,” adding that”I look forward to working with each towards making our communities safer and protecting families from crime.”

4. (U) Justice Minister Rob Nicholson separately on January 29held a news conference to attack the Liberals as “soft on crime.”He announced that the government would reintroduce key justice bills that had lapsed when Parliament prorogued in December,including a bill (C-15) to impose mandatory minimum sentences for serious drug crimes. He noted that the government would -unusually — introduce C-15 first in the Senate. In the previous session, the Liberal majority in the Senate had weakened the mandatory minimums in the bill to preserve judicial discretion.Liberal Senators had also tried (and failed) to amend a bill to eliminate enhanced credit for pre-trial detention. However, of the17 crime bills introduced by the Conservatives in the previous session, only two spent more than six months in the Senate, and most died on the order paper when the Conservatives prorogued Parliament (ref c).

STILL COMMITTED TO REFORM

5. (U) The Prime Minister pledged that his government would continue to push for “a more democratic, accountable and effective”Senate. Although legally eligible to serve until 75 years of age,all of the new appointees (as in the 2008 appointments) have reportedly promised to support Conservative legislation limiting their terms to eight years. The appointments attracted no apparent pushback from the Conservative base, which reportedly has accepted the tactics of Senate appointments in order to achieve the greater goal of Senate reform.

6. (U) The five new Senators represent Quebec, Ontario, NewBrunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador. Three have political experience as provincial politicians, and two have provincial cabinet experience, including one in Public Safety, Security,Justice and Correctional Services portfolios. The list of appointees follows:– Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu (Quebec), victims’ rights advocate– Bob Runciman (Ontario), member of the Ontario Legislature–Vim Kochhar (Ontario), businessman and philanthropist– Elizabeth Marshall (NL), member of the Newfoundland Legislature– Rose-May Poirier (NB), member of the New Brunswick Legislature

LIBERAL RESPONSE: HYPOCRISY!

7. (U) Liberal opposition leader Michael Ignatieff accused PM Harper of hypocrisy over the latest appointments, arguing that the PM had failed to respect his political base by breaking his pledge not to appoint senators. He defended the Senate as doing good work”fundamental to Canadian democracy” in double-checking the Commons’ bills, and claimed that PM Harper had used the previously Liberal-dominated Senate as a constitutional scapegoat for stalling his agenda. He insisted that the Liberals also support Senate reform in principle. On January 31, he laid out some “do-able”Senate reform ideas of his own, including twelve-year term limits(versus the Conservatives’ proposal of eight-year terms) and an independent commission to approve Senate candidates proposed by a Prime Minister. Ignatieff promised to push for these reforms in consultation with the provinces, which have a constitutional role in approving any significant changes to the Senate. However, he added that “I don’t think that Senate reform is the highest priority of the hard-pressed middle class of this country.” Other Liberal MPs criticized Harper for diminishing the historical independent role of the Senate by making it an extension of his partisan caucus.

8. (SBU) Comment: The Conservatives have used Senate reform and law-and-order as political “wedge” issues to bolster their base and to label the Liberals as soft-on-crime. In doing so, the Conservatives have often overstated the Senate’s ability to obstruct legislation. The Conservatives’ new Senate role marks an important shift, enhancing the current government’s ability to advance its own agenda and putting a more conservative – and Conservative — ideological stamp on the Senate that will last for years, regardless of which party forms the next government.

JACOBSON

 

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#05OTTAWA268 #cablegate PLACING A NEW NORTH AMERICAN INITIATIVE 05OTTAWA268

Viewing cable 05OTTAWA268, PLACING A NEW NORTH AMERICAN INITIATIVE #cablegate #05OTTAWA268

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  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05OTTAWA268 2005-01-28 15:56

2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
 
281556Z Jan 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000268

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR WHA/CAN – BREESE AND HOLST

WHITE HOUSE/NSC – SHIRZAD

STATE PASS USTR FOR CHANDLER

USDOC FOR 4320/OFFICE OF NAFTA/GWORD/TFOX;
3134/OIO/WESTERN HEMISPHERE

TREASURY FOR IMI

GENEVA FOR USTR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD EINV CA
SUBJECT: PLACING A NEW NORTH AMERICAN INITIATIVE
IN ITS ECONOMIC POLICY CONTEXT

REF: (A) 04 Ottawa 3431 (Regulatory agenda)

(B) 04 Ottawa 066 (Canadian trade policy)

SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION
——————–

1. THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE USG CHANNELS.

2. (SBU) An incremental and pragmatic package of tasks for a new North American Initiative (NAI) will likely gain the most support among Canadian policymakers. Our research leads us to conclude that such a package should tackle both “security” and “prosperity” goals. This fits the recommendations of Canadian economists who have assessed the options for continental integration. While in principle many of them support more ambitious integration goals, like customs union/single market and/or single currency, most believe the incremental approach is most appropriate at this time, and all agree that it helps pave the way to these goals if and when North Americans choose to pursue them.

3. (SBU) The economic payoff of the prospective North American initiative – in terms of higher incomes and greater competitiveness – is available, but its size and timing are unpredictable, so it should not be oversold. Still, a respectable economic case has been made for such an initiative, and this message spells it out. We believe that, given growing Canadian concern about “border risk” and its effects on investment, a focus on the “security” side could also produce the most substantial economic/trade benefits.

END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION

CANADIAN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
—————————–

4. (SBU) Canadian economists in business, academia and government have given extensive thought to the possible options for further North American integration. Nearly all of this work assumes that each of the three countries is pursuing standard economic policy goals – growth, productivity and competitiveness (rather than more specific concerns raised by Mexican analysts such as migration management, regional development, or environmental protection). Since 9/11, Canadian economists working in this area have generally endorsed a comprehensive initiative with the United States on security, trade, and immigration. Following is our summary of the professional consensus:

PROCESS: At this time, an “incremental” approach to integration is probably better than a “big deal” approach. However, governments should focus on choosing their objectives, and not on choosing a process.

BORDER VS. PERIMETER: Even with zero tariffs, our land borders have strong commercial effects. Some of these effects are positive (such as law enforcement and data gathering), so our governments may always want to keep some kind of land border in place. Canada and the United States already share a security perimeter to some degree; it is just a question of how strong we want to make it.

BORDER RISK: The risk that business will be obstructed at the border by discretionary U.S. actions, such as measures to defend against terrorism or infectious disease, in addition to growing congestion, have become major risks to the economy, inhibiting investment in Canada. For small businesses, the complexities of navigating the border are apparently even more intimidating than the actual costs. Reducing this risk is Canada’s top motive for pursuing further integration.

LABOR MARKETS: Many Canadian economists point to labor markets – both within and among countries – as the factor market where more liberalization would deliver the greatest economic benefits for all three countries. They advocate freeing up professional licensing laws, and developing a quick, simple, low-cost work permit system, at least for U.S. and Canadian citizens.

REGULATION: Canadian economists agree that Canadian regulations (if not their standards, then their complexity) are needlessly restricting foreign investment and impeding food, communications and other industries. (Inter-provincial differences are important here, since Canada’s federal government does not have the benefit of a U.S.-style “interstate commerce” clause). While much of the problem is domestic in nature, an international initiative could help to catalyze change.

CUSTOMS UNION: A common external tariff, or a customs union which eliminated NAFTA’s rules of origin (ROO), is economically desirable. NAFTA’s ROO are so restrictive that importers often prefer to pay the tariff rather than try to prove North American origin. However, economists differ on the size of the benefits available and on whether these would justify the effort of negotiation. One study estimated that a full customs union which eliminated ROO would only raise national income by about one percent.

CURRENCY UNION: Canadian economists are split on whether a return to a fixed exchange rate, or adopting the U.S. dollar, would benefit Canada in current circumstances. (Canada last tied its dollar to the U.S. dollar from 1962 to 1970). The central bank governor has taken the position that “monetary union is an issue that should be considered once we have made more progress towards establishing a single market.”

NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION: WHAT WE KNOW
—————————————–

5. (SBU) Past integration (not just NAFTA but also many bilateral and unilateral steps) has increased trade, economic growth, and productivity. Studies suggest that border efficiency and transportation improvements (such as the lower cost and increased use of air freight) have been a huge part of this picture. Indeed, they may have been more important to our growing prosperity over the past decade than NAFTA’s tariff reductions. Freight and passenger aviation are critically important to our continent’s competitiveness, and businesses are very sensitive to the timing, security, and reliability of deliveries – hence the “border risk” which so concerns Canadian policymakers.

6. (SBU) A stronger continental “security perimeter” can strengthen economic performance, mainly by improving efficiency at land borders and airports. It could also facilitate future steps toward trilateral economic integration, such as a common external tariff or a customs union, if and when our three countries chose to pursue them. Paradoxically, the security and law enforcement aspects of the envisioned initiative could hold as much – or more – potential for broad economic benefits than the economic dimension.

WHERE’S THE UPSIDE?
——————-

7. (SBU) Some international economic initiatives (such as FTAs) produce across-the-board measures that generate broad benefits for a country’s industries and consumers on a known time-line. This was true of NAFTA but it is less likely to be true of the economic aspects of the NAI. Non-tariff barriers such as standards and regulations generally must be tackled one- by-one. This is a piecemeal process and the ratio of payoff to effort is likely to be lower than with across- the-board measures. Governments naturally focus on resolving the problems which their firms or citizens bring to their attention. While this approach has merits, it tends to deliver the payoffs toward particular interests. If there are hidden costs, there might be little impact on national performance. As we move toward a list of barriers to tackle, it will remain important to balance those interests. For example, some Canadian economists have suggested that NAFTA fell short of expectations with respect to increasing consumer choice in Canada; that may be a theme we should stress as efforts to promote further integration take shape.

8. (SBU) In contrast, cooperative measures on the “security” side, a critical focus of current bilateral efforts, can deliver substantial, early, and widespread economic benefits. Security and law enforcement within North America have evolved rapidly since 9/11, leading to many less-than-perfect processes for handling legitimate international traffic. Collaboration to improve these processes could yield efficiency improvements which would automatically be spread widely across the economy, leading to general gains in trade, productivity, and incomes.

A NOTE OF CAUTION
—————–

9. (SBU) There is little basis on which to estimate the size of the “upside” gains from an integration initiative concentrating on non-tariff barriers of the kind contained in NAI. For this reason, we cannot make claims about how large the benefits might be on a national or continental scale. When advocating NAI, it would be better to highlight specific gains to individual firms, industries or travelers, and especially consumers.

CELLUCCI

 
 

Perimeter Security Deal – Canadian MP’s Warn About Threat To Sovereignty And Rights

0NAU- Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and American President Obama recently announced the finalization of their common security perimeter deal for North America. When asked where the funds will come from to implement this fortress north america scheme, the Canadian government responded that it would come from money saved via cuts to public services. The cost has been initially reported to be $1-Billion but we all know how these things work, expect that price to skyrocket out of control fast!

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